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A Guide to Admissibility and Use
I. INTRODUCTION
Forensic scientists have long hoped for the ability "to identify the origin
of blood and body-fluid stains with the same degree of certainty as finger-
prints."' Recent advances in recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA")
research offer scientists the necessary technology. Consequently, DNA
technology now provides the judicial system with a powerful new test to
identify criminal suspects and to trace paternity.
Every individual, except an identical twin, possesses a unique genetic
"blueprint" known as DNA. DNA is found in every chromosome of every cell
in the human body; thus, an individual's blood, semen, skin, and hair can
provide virtual positive identification of that person through his or her DNA.2
Because of this unique pattern, scientists can use DNA tests to identify
individuals much like criminologists use fingerprints to identify individuals.
DNA fingerprinting has several forensic applications. First, DNA
evidence recovered from the scene of a crime can link a suspect to the
crime. In particular, DNA tests are quite useful in rape cases,4 where the
outcome of the prosecution often hinges on the victim's word against the word
of the alleged attacker. DNA tests can also be utilized in cases where the
court is attempting to determine a child's father. Because "[p]ortions of DNA
are transmitted from parent to child ... DNA tests can tell the courts whether
two people are related by comparing their DNA."s Third, DNA tests are also
helpful to determine whether a crime is part of a series of crimes or whether
it is merely a "copy-cat" crime. Police can compare DNA obtained from
different crime scenes and determine whether there were different perpetra-
1. Barbara E. Dodd, DNA Fingerprinting in Matters of Family and Crime, 26
NATURE 506, 506 (1985).
2. See Ricki Lewis, Witness for the Prosecution, DISCOVER, June 1988, at 47.
3. Laurel Beeler & William R. Wiebe, Comment, DNA Identification Tests and
the Courts, 63 WASH. L. REv. 903, 955 n.2 (1988).
4. Id.
5. See id. at 905 n.2.
1
Fontg: Fontg: DNA Fingerprinting
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
tors.6 Finally, DNA fingerprinting can be used to exculpate wrongly accused
individuals.
Many scientists firmly accept the scientific reliability and accuracy of
DNA fingerprints.8 Consequently, genetic fingerprinting is quickly becoming
an established identification tool in law enforcement. A variety of issues must
be resolved, however, as applications of DNA fingerprinting become more
widespread. In addition to these issues, doubts are beginning to surface
concerning the accuracy of DNA fingerprinting; some scientists and commen-
tators question DNA fingerprinting's infallibility in application. In short, there
are no empirical studies to date that support the claims of infallibility asserted
by the companies that conduct DNA tests for law enforcement agencies.9
This Comment discusses the current law regarding DNA fingerprinting.
A discussion of the history and development of DNA will familiarize the
reader with DNA, its forensic applications, and the laboratories that perform
the tests. In addition, this Comment discusses evidentiary and constitutional
concerns relating to DNA fingerprinting. Such concerns will be evaluated
both from the defense's and the prosecution's perspective to provide
guidelines when defending or prosecuting a claim involving DNA evidence.
In its final section, this Comment discusses the future of DNA fingerprinting
in the courts and compares it to the advent of fingerprint and polygraph
evidence, examining their benefits and weaknesses.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF DNA FINGERPRINTING
DNA fingerprinting was discovered in 1985 during the study of other
genetic phenomena known as "hypervariable regions." 0 The DNA technique
arose by chance from research "that was not aimed specifically at solving
6. Id. at 956.
7. Id. See also Clare M. Tande, DNA Typing: A New Investigatory Tool, 1989
DUKE L.J. 474, 474-75 (citing Regina v. Pitchfork, THE TiMEs (London), Jan. 23,
1988, at col. 1 (Leicester Crown Court Jan. 22, 1988)) (by using DNA fingerprinting,
English law enforcement authorities not only exculpated an innocent man, but also
apprehended the true murderer when all other leads proved useless).
8. "The use of DNA probes has been so thoroughly assimilated into molecular
biology that ... it is hard to know how we get along without them." Beeler & Wiebe,
supra note 3, at 907.
9. See infra notes 109-30 and accompanying text.
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practical problems."" Currently, three private laboratories12 as well as the
F.B.I. laboratory 3 engage in DNA fingerprinting.
Historically, "DNA tests were developed for use in the field of molecular
biology in the search for the chromosomal location of particular genes, such
as those that cause inherited diseases." 4 These tests were developed to
allow physicians to predict the presence of an inherited disease at an early
stage, thus allowing early treatment and successful cure of the disease. 5 In
the clinical setting, "DNA tests have helped identify the defective DNA
associated with Huntington's disease, Duchenne muscular dystrophy, sickle
cell disease, cystic fibrosis, and other afflictions."'
6
Although specific laboratory procedures for DNA analysis vary, a general
familiarity with how the tests work is useful to understand how DNA tests
identify individuals:
First, DNA is extracted from the forensic sample, such as semen, blood, or
other cellular tissue. Second, the long strands of molecules which make up
the DNA are chemically cut into fragments. These fragments are sorted by
length. Third, a radioactive "probe" is added. This probe binds with
specific portions of the DNA to create a pattern, which varies from
individual to individual. Because the probe is radioactive, the pattern can
be captured on x-ray film. Fourth, the pattern is compared with the pattern
produced by the suspect's DNA. If the patterns match, the forensic sample
is linked with a high degree of certainty to the suspect. If they do not
match, the forensic sample did not come from the suspect.
17
11. Dodd, supra note 1, at 511 (Dr. Alec Jeffreys developed DNA fingerprinting.
He is a British geneticist and professor of genetics at the University of Leicester,
England).
12. The three private labs providing DNA testing are Lifecodes in Valhalla, N.Y.;
Cellmark Diagnostic in Germantown, Md.; and Cetus Corp. in Emeryville, Cal. The
three companies specialize in different approaches. Lifecodes concentrates on
combinations of single-locus probes, Cellmark on multilocus and single-locus probes,
and Cetus on the dot-blot method (Basically, the three DNA printing approaches differ
in the clarity and sensitivity of the final result. See infra notes 34-41 and accompany-
ing text for further distinctions among the three labs.).
13. Andrew H. Malcolm, F.B.L Opening Doors to Wide Use of Genetic Tests in
Solving Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1989, at Al, col 1 (the F.B.I. lab is also
analyzing all three of the methods utilized by the private companies to determine the
most appropriate one for various forensic situations).
14. Beeler & Wiebe, supra note 3, at 905; see also Ray White & Jean-Marc
Lalouel, Chromosome Mapping with DNA Markers, Set. AM., Feb. 1988, at 40.
15. See Beeler & Wieber, supra note 3, at 905 n.11.
16. Id. n.12-16.
17. Id. For an excellent overview of DNA fingerprinting, see generally Dan L.
Burk, DNA Fingerprinting: Possibilities and Pitfalls of a New Technique, 28
1992]
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The method of obtaining a DNA print varies among labs, but the
principles behind the methodologies are constant. The process begins by
extracting the DNA from a specimen of blood, semen, hair, or skin. 8 Once
extracted and placed under a high-power microscope, the DNA appears like
a ladder that has been twisted into a spiral. This structure is called the double
helix. Within the double helix are four molecules that can be analogized to
chemical building blocks. The sequence of these chemical blocks determines
an individual's genetic code.19
Much of a person's genetic code, such as the number of arms and legs
and fingers and toes, remains the same from individual to individual, and
cannot be used to differentiate sample cell groups.20 Other areas of the
DNA, however, vary from one person to the next, with each configuration of
chemical building blocks displaying a unique pattern.2'
These areas are the regions that were being researched when the process
for DNA typing was discovered.22 It is in these regions that samples provide
identification unique to a particular individual.? Enzymes are used to cut
the DNA into sections to facilitate viewing the pattern of these regions.
24
JURIMETRICS J. 455 (1988). Another introductory article discussing the new technique
is K. F. Kelly et al., Method and Application of DNA Fingerprinting: A Guide for the
Non-scientist, 1987 CRIM. L. REv. 105.
18. See generally Lewis, supra note 2, at 47-49.
19. The four chemical building blocks are adenine (A), cytosine (C), guanine (G),
and thymine (1). They make up the sides of the double helix, each chemical building
block only joining with its pair on the other side of the "ladder." A always attaches
with T, and G with C, so that the sequence of building blocks on one strand is always
complemented by the sequence on the other strand. See generally id. at 47-48.
20. Id. at 47.
21. Id. These areas are referred to as "junk DNA" as well as "mini-satellites" and
"hypervariable regions." See Merz, supra note 10, at 2193.
22. See Merz, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
23. Id. at 2193; see also Thomas H. Maugh II, "Fingerprints" in DNA Hold
Identity Clues, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1985, at I 1, col. 3.
24. CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 205, at 74-75 (3d ed.
Supp. 1987). Restriction enzymes cut the DNA strands whenever they encounter a
specific sequence in the genetic code (the sequence of chemical building blocks in the
DNA). The sites at which a restriction enzyme will chop a length of DNA thus
depends on the DNA sequence; for example, the restriction enzyme Pst 1 always cuts
at the sequence CTG-CAG. Because the restriction enzymes cut the DNA at
characteristic locations, restriction fragments of various lengths are produced, usually
in the range of several hundred to several thousand base pairs of chemical blocks. The
mini-satellite regions, those unique to every individual, are excised by the restriction
enzymes that have cut the DNA strands at the specified sequences of chemical building
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These sections are then organized by size, and the excised fragments neatly
aligned.25 At this stage, the "DNA fingerprint" can be analogized to a
conventional fingerprint before it has been dusted. 6
To make the DNA print, man-made DNA probes are introduced to the
DNA fragments. 27 The probes are tagged radioactively and contain those
sequences of the chemical building blocks that determine individual traits.
The probes attach themselves to the DNA fragments in which they fit.'
A piece of x-ray film is then placed over the probes that attached to the
DNA fragments. After the film is developed, black bars on the film mark the
location of the probes. 29 Because the individual traits encoded by the DNA
in these regions differ from person to person, the bars from each of the
different probes appear at different locations for each individual. The
resulting pattern appears something like a supermarket bar code used on
groceries.30 This pattern is the unique DNA fingerprint.
The DNA print is an x-ray that can be displayed on a light box.
31
When the bar codes from two different samples match, the samples came from
the same person.32 In addition to this visual examination to determine a
match, statistics are also employed. By consulting a database of how
frequently a pattern appears, the DNA evidence is even more convincing.
25. MCCORMICK, supra note 24, § 205, at 74. The sections are organized through
a process called electrophoresis. Electrophoresis is a method to separate particles for
both preparative and analytical studies of macromolecules. The particles are separated
primarily by their charge and to a lesser extent on the basis of their size and shape.
J. STENESH, DICrIONARY OF BIOCHEMISTRY 149 (1989). DNA restriction fragments
are separated by electrophoresis to make the unique pattern that serves as the identity
profile, or "DNA fingerprint." Thomas H. Maugh II, Genetic Fingerprinting Joins
Crime War, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1988, at 13, col. 1. Although electrophoresis is a part
of the technique for making a DNA print, in the realm of scientific evidence,
electrophoresis refers more specifically to the technique used by forensic scientists for
separating red cell enzymes and serum proteins. See PAUL C. GIANELLI & EDWARD
J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 17-8(C), at 594-95 (1986).




30. Id. Advocates of the technique say that the appearance of the DNA print in
this fashion is an advantage because it can be explained easily to a jury. "Everyone
is different and we just match them up," said Peter Gill, one of the researchers who
developed the technique. Stephen Strauss, DNA Fingerprinting, TECH. REV., Feb.-Mar.
1988, at 8.
31. Lewis, supra note 2, at 50.
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If DNA from two individuals is compared, the chances are about 20% that
any given band will appear in both DNA fingerprints. The chances that two
given bands will be present in both samples is [sic] 4%. And the chances
that all 15 will be present in both are virtually nil: about three in 100
billion-or somewhat greater than the chance that conventional fingerprints
from two individuals will be identical.33
Thus, according to its proponents, DNA fingerprinting can identify or
exonerate an individual with virtual certainty.
According to officials at Cellmark Diagnostics, the company that holds
an exclusive North American license to market Dr. A. J. Jeffreys' DNA
technique, there is only a one in 30 billion chance that any two persons' DNA
prints will match and create a false positive result (except in the case of
identical twins).3 ' The two other labs in the United States that offer DNA
typing-Lifecodes Corporation and Cetus Corporation-claim slightly
different rates of reliability. Lifecodes, which uses a technique very similar
to Cellmark, claims a 99.9 percent probability that biological samples are
derived from the same person if their two DNA patterns match.35 Unlike the
other two companies, Cetus does not guarantee that its typing will identify a
suspect with virtual certainty; 36 it claims only that "one out of every several
thousand people ... could have left a particular sample. 37 Cetus, however,
can type smaller biological samples than the other two companies because it
uses a technique that "amplifies" the target DNA by creating numerous copies
of it. Theoretically, Cetus can test a sample as small as a single hair cell, 38
and the company has actually produced a print from a sample as small as 40
sperm heads. 39 The other labs, Cellmark and Lifecodes, require larger
samples, such as several hundred thousand sperm heads or a well-soaked
blood stain the size of a quarter.40 Unfortunately, police are less likely to
find samples of this size at the typical crime scene. Indeed, many Cellmark
33. Maugh supra note 23, at I 1, col. 1. The odds are measured in terms of
millions or billions to one that two people will have the same genetic pattern. The
figure most often cited is one in 30 billion. Merz, supra note 10, at 2193. Compare
id. with Maugh, supra note 23, at 1 3, col. 2 (the odds that conventional fingerprints
from two individuals will be identical are about one in 64 billion).
34. Mark Thompson, DNA Fingerprinting: Who Does it and How, 8 CAL. LAW.,
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and Lifecodes tests have produced inconclusive results because the samples
were too small for their methods to work effectively.4'
III. BENEFITS OF DNA FINGERPRINTING
The primary advantage of DNA typing is its remarkable accuracy and
thus its ability to provide nearly positive identification. This accuracy is
especially true of the Cellmark and Lifecodes techniques. Advocates of DNA
typing in criminal investigations claim that the method can identify suspects
with "virtual certainty."42 DNA typing works much like fingerprinting and
is much more accurate than traditional blood, semen, or hair-typing tests.43
DNA typing is particularly effective in rape cases. First, the method can
test each semen sample of sufficient size.44 Testing techniques traditionally
used in rape investigations identify suspects based on antigens-proteins that
are normally present in semen.45  Nearly twenty percent of all males,
however, do not secrete antigens, and thus traditional testing methods cannot
identify those males.46 DNA typing does not have this limitation, however,
because semen always leaves DNA prints. Another advantage of DNA typing
in rape cases is that the DNA found in sperm can be separated from the
vaginal cells that are often mixed with sperm ,in forensic samples.47
Although this mixing often has thwarted attempts at traditional testing of
semen, it will not hinder DNA typing."
DNA typing is also unique because of the range of forensic samples that
it can test. Potential samples include blood, semen, hair, and skin scrap-
ings.49 Police are more likely to find these kinds of samples at crime scenes
than fingerprints, particularly in rape investigations where semen samples may
be the only available evidence.5"
41. Id.





47. See Peter Gill et al., Forensic Application ofDNA 'Fingerprints,'318 NATURE
577, 577 (1985) ("sperm nuclei can be separated from vaginal cellular debris, obtained
from semen-contaminated vaginal swabs, enabling positive identification of the male
donor/suspect").
48. Burk, supra note 17, at 464.
49. Moss, supra note 32, at 66.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990).
1992]
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DNA typing can also be performed on forensic samples that have dried
and aged, whereas traditional tests cannot.5' The DNA's structure is
sufficiently hardy so that law enforcement authorities may reopen old cases
and compare forensic samples from a number of crimes, even if the samples
have aged substantially, to see whether the same assailant was involved.
Successful tests have been performed on samples up to four years old.52
Since the development of DNA fingerprinting as a forensic tool,
proponents of the technique have predicted the establishment of a DNA data
bank.53 One commentator has urged as follows:
Law enforcement officials have a sparkling, once-in-a-lifetime opportunity
to take a dramatically bold step forward to significantly reduce crime in our
state ....
A data bank of bodily tissues taken from the scene of each unsolved
crime (as well as solved crimes) needs to be established on an urgent basis.
This data bank would represent a counterpart to the presently established
fingerprint files but with an even greater capacity to resolve unsolved
crimes. Blood specimens, hairs, mucous fluids, semen, and other human
evidence removed from the scene of a crime must be saved and classified.
In that manner, arrested detainees could have their DNA structure obtained
upon detention, and checked against the data bank of unsolved crimes. 54
The first data bank was established in King County, Washington, where
an ordinance required everyone convicted of sex offenses to be "genetically
fingerprinted."5 5  The fingerprints are on file, ready for use in future
investigations.56 In 1985, California passed a law ordering all convicted sex
offenders to provide blood and saliva specimens upon release from prison.57
51. Moss, supra note 32, at 66.
52. Burk, supra note 17, at 464 ("Success has been reported in fingerprinting
DNA from dried blood and semen samples up to four years old.").
53. See Philip Hilts, New Crime Identification Tool Devised, WASH. POST, Sept.
20, 1987, at A23 (according to James E. Starrs, attorney and forensic expert at George
Washington University, "police will build DNA identification files like the massive
fingerprint files that now exist); Gary Marx, DNA "Fingerprints" May One Day Be
Our National ID Card, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1989, at A14 (discussion of the
possibility of DNA fingerprints as identifiers for national data banks).
54. Jerry Boris, Time is Now for DNA Data Base, PA. L.J. REP., Mar. 28, 1988,
at 2.
55. Rob Stein, Genetic Fingerprints: A Boon to Law Enforcement or a Rights
Violation?, PA. L.J. REP., May 2, 1988, at 12.
56. See id. at 10.
57. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.2 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990). Because prisoners
have limited Fourth Amendment rights, requiring them to provide blood and saliva
samples does not appear to be a constitutional violation even absent individualized
[Vol. 57
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These samples, numbering over 4,200 in 1988, will be submitted for DNA
analysis and the results stored in a .computerized forensic DNA data bank.58
Law enforcement authorities could easily computerize the data from DNA
prints because of their bar code structure.5 9 Fingerprints have occasionally
been computerized, but their structure is too complex to accurately symbolize
and to efficiently search by computer?6 In contrast, DNA prints are easy to
symbolize in a numeric form that is suitable for computer access.
61
California Attorney General John Van de Kamp has called for a statewide
computerized database of DNA fingerprints so that local police can use the
system to match crime scene evidence to potential suspects.62 Other states
are considering establishing computerized genetic data banks of individuals
convicted of violent crimes,63 and the FBI is proposing a data bank as
well.6
suspicion. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979) (body cavity searches of
inmates permitted without probable cause or reasonable suspicion); Ferguson v.
Caldwell, 392 F. Supp. 750, 752 (D. Ariz. 1975) (no probable cause or warrant
required for blood sample from prisoners). This restricted Fourth Amendment
protection, however, appears to further the interest in effective prison management
rather than the interests in future law enforcement.
58. Stephen G. Michaud, DNA Detectives, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 6, 1988, § 6
(Magazine), at 73; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.2 (West 1988).
59. Thompson, supra note 34, at 42.
60. Id.
61. California Attorney General John Van de Kamp predicts that within three to
five years his office will have a database of genetic fingerprints on computer. When
the system is on-line, local law enforcement officials say that "most rapists might as
well leave calling cards at the scene of their crime." Id. at 42. Van de Kamp also has
expressed concern, however, that such a database may threaten privacy interests. "It
is one thing to have fingerprints and criminal histories accessible to tens of thousands
of police officers .... It is another to have information on-line that can mark you as
a carrier of AIDS, or prove that you are not genetically related to either of your
parents." Moss, supra note 32, at 70.
62. Id. at 70.
63. Marx, supra note 53, at A14, col. 1.
64. Moss, supra note 32, at 70. The FBI reports that it expects to digitalize DNA
test results, providing a variety of identification applications. See Michaud, supra note
58, at 104; see also Merz, supra note 10, at 2194 (reporting that the FBI is planning
to build a DNA fingerprint computer data bank).
1992]
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IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE FORENSIC USE OF DNA TESTS
DNA tests can be performed only if the biological sample contains a
sufficient amount of DNA.65 For example, DNA tests currently require a
bloodstain roughly the size of a quarter.66 An insufficient sample, however,
does not affect the reliability of DNA tests. If an inadequate sample is tested,
the test is unreadable and produces no identification, and thus neither falsely
incriminates an innocent suspect nor exculpates a guilty one. Therefore, an
inadequate sample size does not affect the reliability of DNA tests because the
results are merely inconclusive when an inadequate sample is tested.
Despite the attempts of some members of the legal community to prevent
the use of the forensic technique until it is proven reliable enough to withstand
judicial scrutiny, the promise of DNA identification evidence in criminal cases
has proven too tempting for law enforcement officials to resist.67 The
technique has gained popularity at an exponential rate from its introduction in
the United States in 1987.68 The method was hailed initially as "foolproof"
and 99 percent positive; such exaggerations were based on the testimony of
interested parties, such as scientists from those companies that sell their test
results at a profit and prosecutors who use the results to gain convictions.69
Caught off guard by the storm, and perhaps assuming that there was no way
around the damning evidence, defense attorneys were unable to combat the
evidence effectively or find scientists to testify as experts against the
procedure.
The first case to challenge the infallibility of DNA profiling was People
v. Castro,70 a double murder case in New York. Twenty-year-old Vilma
Ponce and her two-year-old daughter were stabbed to death in their apartment
on February 5, 1987. There were few leads until police arrested the building's
superintendent, Joseph Castro, and found some dried blood that he said was
his own in the grooves of his watch. Prosecutors sent that specimen, samples
65. The use of DNA tests in paternity cases should not be affected by the sample
size and environmental factors because an ample supply of high quality DNA material
is available from all the parties.
66. George F. Sensabaugh, Forensic Biology-Is Recombinant DNA Technology
in its Future?, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 393, 395 (1986).
67. In September 1987, only one-third of the nation's crime lab directors thought
DNA typing was ready for forensic use. Mark Thompson, DNA's Troubled Debut, 8
CAL. LAW., June 1988, at 36, 44.
68. Id. at 41.
69. Dr. Michael Baird of Lifecodes stated, "If you're a criminal, it's like leaving
your name, address, and social security number at the scene of the crime. It's that
precise." Lewis, supra note 2, at 44.
70. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
[Vol. 57
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of the victims' blood, and a sample of Castro's blood to Lifecodes for DNA
typing. Lifecodes declared a match between the DNA in the blood on the
watch and the DNA in Vilma Ponce's blood. If the case had followed the
normal course of events in prior cases involving DNA evidence, Castro would
have pleaded guilty immediately, doubting his ability to fight the evidence in
court.
71
This case did not, however, follow the usual course of events. Defense
attorneys Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld located experts who agreed to
testify against the admission of the DNA typing evidence. For twelve weeks
New York Supreme Court Acting Judge Gerald Sheindlin listened to experts
from both sides.72 The defense experts uncovered such serious blunders
committed by Lifecodes in performing the test that the prosecution's main
expert witnesses recanted their position. In an unprecedented move, two
expert witnesses for the defense and two for the prosecution, after consulting
outside the courtroom, issued a statement declaring, "[t]he DNA data in this
case are not scientifically reliable enough to support the assertion that the
samples ... do or do not match. If these data were submitted to a peer-
reviewed journal in support of a conclusion, they would not be accepted.
Further experimentation would be required."73 Ultimately, Judge Sheindlin
ruled the evidence of the match inadmissible.
People v. Castro highlighted the disparity between theory and reality.
Members of the scientific community engaged in related diagnostic research
should note the critical importance of the technique as applied to forensics.
The relevance of this issue is a disparity in practice between scientists in
forensic research and scientists in diagnostic research. For example, standards
in the research laboratory do not need to be as strict as in the forensic
laboratory.74 Perhaps the most important difference is that in the forensic
process an individual's future is linked directly to the accuracy of the result.
Recent literature reveals critical flaws in the application of the diagnostic
technique to forensics that render DNA testing unreliable from a scientific
standpoint. The main criticism is not that the test will never be reliable, but
that the lack of uniform standards and quality controls allow problems in the
technique to go unnoticed, thus resulting in the scientifically unreliable
declaration of a match.75
71. See generally, Marshall Ingwerson, DNA Fingerprints: When the Proof is in
the Genes, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 12, 1988, at 3.
72. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
73. Eric S. Lander, DNA Fingerprinting on Trial, 339 NATURE 501, 504 (1989).
74. William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight
of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 56-57 (1989).
75. Lander, supra note 73, at 501.
1992]
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Recent court decisions have focused not on the reliability of the scientific
theory behind DNA fingerprinting, but on the specific procedures followed in
a particular case. Before results of the DNA typing technique can be accepted
as scientifically reliable in forensics, the following controls and standards must
be developed: (a) controls to ensure the accurate interpretation of results; (b)
standards for declaring matches; (c) standards for determining the probability
of a coincidental match and for determining the relevant population studies;
(d) standards for record keeping; and (e) standards for proficiency testing in
licensing.
A. Lack of Controls to Ensure Accurate
Interpretation of Results
In the forensic laboratory, there are three problem areas that can lead to
errors in declaring matches between samples of DNA. One area concerns the
problems inherent in any scientific laboratory engaged in this type of
research-namely, the problems of contamination and laboratory slop.76
Second, specific to the forensic laboratory are the likely problems of
contamination and degradation of the forensic sample. For example, evidence
left at room temperature can be degraded by bacteria.77 Finally, an inescap-
able problem, for forensic DNA profiling specifically, is the complexity of the
results and potential examiner bias in interpreting those results. All three
areas can cause the examiner to declare an improper match and can remain
undetected unless specific controls are employed.
In State v. Wimberly,78 the Supreme Court of South Dakota had to
determine whether DNA fingerprinting evidence provided sufficiently reliable
results for use in court. Specifically, the Wimberly court had to determine
whether FBI procedures were sufficiently reliable. Although the court held
DNA fingerprinting admissible, it stated that DNA fingerprint evidence
remains subject to attack on other grounds:
Issues pertaining to relevancy or prejudice may be raised. For example,
expert testimony may be presented to impeach the particular procedures
used in a specific test or the reliability of the results obtained. (citations
omitted). In addition, traditional challenges to the admissibility of evidence
such as the contamination of the sample or chain of custody questions may
be presented. These issues relate to the weight of the evidence. The
76. Thompson & Ford, supra note 74, at 87 n.188.
77. People v. Miles, 577 N.E.2d 477, 483 (111. App. Ct. 1991).
78. 467 N.W.2d 499 (S.D. 1991).
[Vol. 57
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evidence may be found to be so tainted that it is totally unreliable and,
therefore, must be excluded. 79
Reproducibility is the fundamental test for acceptance of results in the
scientific community. For example, in State v. Williams,"0 the court stated
that where there was testimony concerning the "guidelines for procedures and
standards in the scientific community at large which allow [DNA] researchers
to obtain reliable, reproducible results," then "the trial court did not err in
admitting the evidence of the DNA testing and DNA identifications by finding
the evidence to be reliable, scientific evidence."
81
In People v. Castro,82 the faulty interpretations of the autoradiographs
were not reproducible. Many of the problems experienced in Castro can be
rectified by implementing proper controls to catch errors and ensure accurate
interpretation. Until proper controls are researched and implemented, the
results obtained in DNA typing tests is not reliable.
B. Lack of Standards for Declaring Matches
Even today, when interpretation of the banding pattern is generally
considered reliable, there is still a basic problem of lack of objective criteria
in the scientific community for declaring a match. With the advent of
standard procedures promulgated by the FBI, 4 however, it is likely that
laboratories engaged in DNA fingerprinting will adopt such procedures, thus
creating a uniform system for declaring matches. In fact, People v. Miles'
held that DNA evidence of a match was admissible where an expert witness
had testified that Cellmark laboratory had adopted a written protocol for
testing, and Cellmark followed the "Technical Working Group-Interagency
Working Group of DNA Methodology" guidelines promulgated by the FBI.86
79. Id. at 506 (citations omitted).
80. No. 1-90-175, 1991 WL 156545 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 16, 1991) (citing State
v. Thomas, No. 90-AP-547 (Ohio Ct. App. June 11, 1991)).
81. Id. at *3.
82. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
83. See Lander, supra note 73, at 501; Thompson & Ford, supra note 74, at 88.
84. See generally State v. Nelson, Cr.A. Nos. IK89-09-0882 to IK89-09-0884,
1991 WL 190308 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 1991). For a detailed explanation of the
FBI guidelines, see id. at *4 (citing United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D.
Vt. 1990) (the six steps promulgated by the FBI are as follows: (1) extraction of the
DNA; (2) restriction or digestion; (3) gel electrophoresis; (4) southern transfer; (5)
hybridization; and (6) autoradiography)).
85. 577 N.E.2d 477 (II1. App. Ct. 1991).
86. Id. at 483.
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Cellmark's expert also testified that Lifecodes Corporation and all state and
local crime laboratories performing DNA research utilized the same proce-
dures as Cellmark.s7
In Miles, the defendant cited numerous cases where Cellmark's testing
procedures were found so unreliable that their results were inadmissible as
evidence."8 The court, noting that Cellmark had adopted the FBI's guide-
lines, discussed the specific procedures followed at Cellmark:
When a case arrives at Cellmark, it is assigned to one person, who is
responsible for performing tests and following testing procedures. Cellmark
requires its scientists follow a written protocol in performing tests.
Expiration dates ensure chemicals used in the processes are fresh. [The
expert] testified instruments and equipment are kept in working order. A
second Cellmark employee witnesses all steps in the chain of custody as
well as many test procedures. Once the autorads are developed, the
molecular biologist presents them to a Ph.D. scientist for review. The
Ph.D. scientist reviews the entire case file in interpreting the autorad. Two
Ph.D. scientists separately review each case and each writes a report of
findings. The reports are combined in the final document sent to the client.
A laboratory supervisor reviews the report before it is released to the
client.89
The Miles court noted that any question concerning specific procedures used
by the company would go to the weight of the evidence rather than its
admissibility.90 The court, however, said it may need to exclude the
evidence entirely if the procedures are shown to produce an unreliable
result.91
The determination of a standard for declaring matches can never be truly
objective. The question of where to set the threshold determination for
declaring a match is ultimately a policy question. The dilemma that is raised
can be illustrated as follows: If a sample matches another sample in ten out
of twelve bands, it is more likely that the two extra bands were produced by
slop rather than that two random individuals sharing those ten bands in
common. If the examiners adopt a high threshold for matches, they may
exculpate a suspect whose DNA profile is a match. If the threshold is too
low, they may declare a match between two different individuals and inculpate
the innocent.9"
87. Id. at 481.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 483-84.
90. Id. at 483.
91. Id.
92. Thompson & Ford, supra note 74, at 88-91.
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Thus, even if the scientific community defines matching standards, the
standards will necessarily be subjective in nature. If the FBI is allowed to
promulgate these standards, it is arguable that the state's need to fight crime
will take precedence over the desire to protect individual rights. A low
threshold for declaring a match threatens the presumption of innocence given
a criminal defendant and undermines a justice system predicated on the notion
that it is better to let the guilty go free than to condemn the innocent.
C. Lack of Standards for Determining Probability of a
Coincidental Match and Lack of Relevant Population Studies
It is axiomatic to DNA fingerprinting that only an individual's DNA
taken as a whole is unique.93 Thus, the importance of DNA profiling lies in
a scientist's ability to compare as many bands as possible between two
samples, and if they appear to match, to calculate the probability that this
match could be a coincidence. There are no standards in the scientific
community for such calculations because diagnostic research does not require
this step. The methods used to determine the probability statistic are likely
to remain hotly contested by both the prosecution and the defense, because
once the declaration of a match is in evidence, the jury might consider the
statistical probability of a random match to determine if the sample found at
the scene is indeed the defendant's.
The probability determinations involved in this calculation are currently
problematic. The most important criticism is the choice of the relevant
population when determining the probability of a coincidental match. For
instance, the earlier quoted statistic that the chance that twro individuals would
share the same DNA profile is one in thirty billion is based on a study of
fourteen British Caucasians.94 Based on such a small homogeneous popula-
tion, which could have a very different distribution of alleles than the
population at large, the data generated simply does not translate into a reliable
overall statistic for anyone in the population. 95
The sufficiency of the size of the database used for population studies is
a source of much debate.96 There is no scientific consensus on the proper
93. See, e.g., Exparte Perry, No. 89-1534, 1991 WL 84132 (Ala. Apr. 19, 1991);
State v. Davis, No. 71694, 1991 WL 134460 (Mo. July 23, 1991).
94. See Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Hypervariable 'Minisatellite' Regions in Human
DNA, 314 NATURE 67, 68 (1985).
95. Burk, supra note 17, at 465-66.
96. In Cobey v. State, 559 A.2d 391 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 565 A.2d
670 (Md. 1989), where the court decided that the Cellmark DNA test results were
reliable, the defendant unsuccessfully claimed that Cellmark's database of 700
individuals was insufficient, but had no expert witnesses to refute the four prosecution
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database size from which it is acceptable to project statistics for an entire
population. 7  For instance, the studies published by Lifecodes on allele
frequency in a population have been based on small groups of about 200 or
300 people, mostly from New York.98 Until a much wider database is built,
statistical estimates about frequencies of alleles in the entire population should
be conservative.99
Additionally, the lack of recordkeeping standards is far from trivial in
evaluating the reliability of DNA fingerprint evidence. Validation and
reproduction of the results by referring to accurate and complete records is
crucial to the reliability of the technique. For example, Lifecodes failed to
record which of its probes were contaminated, and continued to use and sell
such probes, which could produce false positives in a DNA typing test.'
D. Lack of Proficiency Testing and Licensing Standards
"Forensic science, including DNA testing, is operating in a no man's land
where there are no accredited standards for the laboratories," according to
forensic evidence expert Randolph Jonakait.10' Dr. Eric Lander echoes this
sentiment: "At present, forensic science is virtually unregulated-with the
paradoxical result that clinical laboratories must meet higher standards to be
expert witnesses who claimed that the database fell within generally accepted scientific
criteria.
The Florida District Court of Appeal similarly rejected appellant's arguments in
Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), that Lifecode's
database of 710 samples was too small to be statistically significant. The court cited
testimony that stated as the database expands, the probability numbers do not
drastically change. There were also no defense experts in this case to refute such
testimony.
97. In Andrews, Dr. Baird testified that no one worries too much about the size
of the database and appeared to base his statement on the fact that there was so little
published on the subject. Andrews, 553 So. 2d at 849-50. The only set of guidelines
of which he knew was a 1982 American Association of Blood Banks publication
stating that database sizes from two to five hundred should be adequate. Id. This
publication occurred before the development of forensic DNA typing, however, which
studies many different rare alleles in the population, unlike paternity testing or protein
gel electrophoresis.
98. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 74, at 84 n.177.
99. Mary-Claire King, Invited Editorial: Genetic Testing of Identity and
Relationship, 44 AM. J. HUM. GENETIcs 179, 180 (1989).
100. Thompson & Ford, supra note 74, at 94-96.
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allowed to diagnose strep throat than forensic labs must meet to put a
defendant on death row."
10 2
Critics have lamented the lack of proficiency in forensic laboratories in
the past. In a three-year study funded by the Justice Department, forensic
laboratories received identical dried blood stains; 71.2 percent of the 128 labs
participating in the study either mistyped the sample or reported inconclusive
results. 10 3 This lack of proficiency in state laboratories is frightening, as
most DNA typing will ultimately be performed by these same laboratories.
In 1987, the California Association of Crime Laboratories conducted the
only proficiency testing to date of the three private laboratories engaged in
DNA typing. Fifty samples were sent to each lab. Cetus and Cellmark
mistakenly matched unrelated samples.1°' They did not complete fifty tests
without inculpating an innocent person-surely an unproficient result.
Although Lifecodes called all fifty samples correctly, its researchers, rather
than the technicians who usually perform tests, completed the tests.'0 5 This
type of testing is not nearly as rigorous as blind testing programs, where blind
tests are interspread among real cases. The test only required stating whether
there was a match, and not how close the match was or where the bands were
located; thus the laboratories had a fifty percent chance of obtaining the
correct result. Prudence dictates that passing a battery of blind tests should
be required before a crime laboratory is allowed a license to make determina-
tions that affect an individual's freedom.
A demand for specific licensing requirements is particularly appropriate
because some individuals have urged caution, advising against readily
accepting DNA fingerprinting as reliable evidence without considering the
further verification of the test results' accuracy."c One concern is that most
expert witnesses, who are strongly supportive of the test, come from the
102. Lander, supra note 73, at 505.
103. Beeler & Wiebe, supra note 3, at 929 n.136.
104. Marcia Barinaga, DNA Fingerprinting: Pitfalls Come to Light, 339 NATURE
89, 89 (1989). They identified the problems as the non-binding of DNA to a filter and
the accidental mixing of two samples.
105. Id.
106. California Attorney General John Van de Kamp once voiced strong
objections to the immediate use of DNA fingerprints, although he envisioned a DNA
data bank to be developed within three to five years. He currently has changed his
position, however, and believes that the technique is now ready for use in criminal
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commercial laboratories that offer DNA testing. It has been argued'07 that
such testimony is equivalent to promotion of the companies' product."' 8
E. Statistical Evidence and Its Effect on the Jury
The admissibility of DNA fingerprints involves two types of evidence:
evidence of a match between the samples, and statistical evidence of a random
match.'09 The reliability of the statistics provided by commercial laborato-
ries has not yet been exhaustively researched and documented. One
suggestion is that the only truly accurate method to prove that no two
individuals share the same DNA fingerprint is to test the entire popula-
tion. l0  Obviously, there has been no such undertaking. Commercial
laboratories are reluctant to discuss the bases of their statistics, but they claim
to use sufficient population bases as approved by the American Association
of Blood Banks.' The reliability of statistics based on DNA fingerprints
obtained from crime scenes, rather than under ideal laboratory conditions, has
yet to be extensively tested. 12 Again, once the FBI assumes a more active
role in the field, the reliability of the statistics should become more firmly
determined." 3
107. See Burk, supra note 17, at 468; see also Joseph P. Fried, Prosecutors Move
to Give DNA Evidence in Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1988, at 16 (Defense attorney
Kerry J. Katsorhis challenged the reliability of DNA evidence in a New York rape
case: "You are relying on one group of people [Lifecodes] who are guns for hire, who
are paid to testify.").
108. Cf People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1249 (Cal. 1976) (an advocate of
voiceprint analysis who testifies as an expert "may be too closely identified with the
endorsement of voiceprint analysis to assess fairly and impartially the nature and extent
of any opposing scientific views"); People v. Tobey, 257 N.W.2d 537 (Mich. 1977)
(questioning whether a leading proponent of a technique could fairly testify about the
admissibility of the technique).
109. See generally People v. Miles, 577 N.E.2d 477 (Il. App. Ct. 1991).
110. See Sensabaugh, supra note 66, at 395. "The uniqueness of these
'fingerprints' can be truly established only by testing of all individuals, both living and
dead. Clearly this is not possible, yet anything less leaves open the hypothetical
possibility of an unobserved duplication." Id.
111. See Beeler & Wiebe, supra note 3, at 926.
112. Id. "To avoid concerns that environmental contamination could potentially
produce false or misleading results, continued empirical testing must be conducted to
clearly delineate the limits of DNA tests and to advise controls for the environmental
factors which could affect analysis." Id.
113. A spokesman for the FBI, giving his opinion regarding control of DNA
technology, stated, "[F]orensics is a public activity." Thompson, supra note 34, at 44
(quoting John Hicks, deputy assistant director of the FBI).
[Vol. 57
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Recent state decisions have begun dealing with the issue of population
frequency statistics in their analyses of DNA fingerprinting. In People v.
Miles," 4 the Illinois Court of Appeals discussed how Cellmark Laboratories
generated statistical probabilities of a random sample:
The general procedure for generating such statistical probabilities begins by
comparing the DNA from the evidence ... to the DNA in the suspect's
blood sample to determine if there is a match. If so, then the suspect's
DNA is compared to information in Cellmark's African-American data base
to determine the probability of an African-American other than the
defendant leaving the semen stain on the bed sheet. [The Cellmark expert]
testified the probability was 1 in 300,000."
5
The defendant in Miles argued that Cellmark's population statistics created "a
danger of producing misleading information." 116 The court held, however,
that as an integral part of DNA identification process, the generation of
probability statistics was admissible under the Frye standard." 7
In State v. Brown,"8 the Supreme Court of Iowa also held that because
both statistical evidence and evidence of a match are based on the same
scientific methods and facts, statistical evidence should be admissible once the
reliability of the scientific principles behind the testing procedure is estab-
lished." 9 In Brown, the state introduced evidence of the reliability of the
DNA fingerprinting procedure as well as the mathematical computations. The
court noted, however, that its holding in Brown did not remove the issue of
identity from the jury, which was free to disregard or disbelieve the expert
testimony that had established the statistical probabilities of a random
match. 2 Thus, "[t]he jury was free to compare the expert testimony and




In cases in which statistical frequencies are admitted into evidence, the
prejudicial effect of such evidence on the jury presents a serious problem.
Given the complex nature of the DNA testing process, coupled with the
114. 577 N.E.2d 477 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
115. Id. at 484. The defendant in Miles was an African-American. Id. at 478.
The data base for African-Americans at Cellmark consists of blood samples taken from
about 200 to 300 African-Americans in Detroit, Michigan. Id. at 484.
116. Id. at 484-85.
117. Id. at 485; see also infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the admissibility of DNA fingerprint evidence under the Frye standard.
118. 470 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1991).
119. Id. at 33.
120. Id. at 32-33.
121. Id. at 32.
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extraordinarily high statistics quoted in court, jury members will likely be
overwhelmed by such powerful identification evidence."' Indeed, DNA
fingerprinting is considered extremely convincing evidence to juries who have
heard hours of expert testimony and statistics regarding the improbability of
misidentification or other errors in the procedure.'2 Of course, an argument
that DNA evidence is unduly prejudicial succeeds only if the evidence leads
the jury to decide an issue on improper grounds. 4 Evidence that simply
damages a defendant's case is not prejudicial within the meaning of Rule 403
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 25
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in Ex parte Perry,"26 recognized the
potential prejudicial effect that statistical evidence may have on the jury. In
Perry, the court noted how the admissibility of DNA "matching" evidence and
the admissibility of DNA population frequency statistics is not inherently
interrelated.' 27 From a matheniatical/scientific standpoint, the court stated
that evidence of a match does not automatically indicate the frequency with
which a given DNA pattern might occur statistically; thus, "to establish
population frequency generally requires data on the relevant populations
involved as well as data for the mathematical, statistical analysis."'128
From a legal standpoint, the Perry court noted that population frequency
statistics may cause the jury to draw improper inferences. Namely, the court
recognized the following:
122. "[M]edia portrayal of the techniques as magically foolproof may make the
admission of the test seriously misleading or prejudicial. Even the name 'finger-
printing' may create unsubstantiated beliefs and expectations in the minds of judges
and jurors." Burk, supra note 17, at 468-69 (citing United States v. Williams, 583
F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978)); see also Beeler & Wiebe, supra note 3, at 936 n.172
(collecting cases in which jurors accepted highly technical procedures without critical
evaluation).
123. As one defense attorney stated: "If they print your guy with this stuff you're
dead. You can't combat it. There is no defense to it." Michaud, supra note 58, at
89.
124. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory's committee's note.
125. Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
FED. R. EVID. 403; see also CHARLES MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 185 n.28 and
accompanying text (Edward Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
126. No. 89-1534, 1991 WL 84132 (Ala. Apr. 19, 1991).
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[1]t is [not] necessarily wrong to inform the jury of the underlying statistical
evidence but [sic] there is a real danger that the jury will use the evidence
as a measure of the probability of the defendant's guilt or innocence and
... [such] evidence will thereby undermine the presumption of innocence,
erode the values served by the reasonable doubt standard, and dehumanize
our system of justice.129
Thus, to prevent statistical evidence from having a "potentially exaggerated
impact on the trier of fact," the Supreme Court of Alabama noted that
otherwise admissible population statistics may be inadmissible if the
prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighs its probative value. 30
IV. ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS USED TO EVALUATE
NOVEL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Historically, federal and state courts have generally evaluated the
reliability of novel scientific evidence under one of two standards: the general
acceptance test first stated in Frye v. United States13 ' (the "Frye test") or the
more permissive standard set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence (the
"Federal Rules test"). 32
A. The Frye Test of General Acceptance
The Frye test is the primary test used by federal and state courts to
determine the admissibility of scientific evidence, and thus is the standard that
courts probably will use to evaluate DNA tests. Under the Frye test, courts
admit evidence derived from novel scientific techniques only when the
129. Id. (citing State v. Boyd, 331 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Minn. 1983)).
130. Id. at 13.
131. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
132. FED. R. EVID. 401, 403, 701, 702, and 703. For convenience, the term
"Federal Rules test" will be used to describe the identical tests applied by both state
and federal courts. The state test actually is based upon state rules that parallel the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
All federal courts are bound to follow the Federal Rules tests, although some
federal courts also apply the Frye test. See infra note 133-37 and accompanying text.
Similarly, some state courts apply both state evidence rules and the Frye test.
Alternatives have been proposed to the Frye and Federal Rules tests. For
example, some commentators have proposed that independent panels of experts assess
novel scientific evidence before it is admitted in court, but no such plan has been
implemented. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff & Dorothy Nelkin, Science, Technology, and
the Limits of Judicial Competence, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 266, 274 (1982).
1992]
21
Fontg: Fontg: DNA Fingerprinting
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
techniques have gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific communi-
ty.
133
By requiring acceptance of the techniques by scientists, the Frye test
attempts to ensure that the techniques are reliable.134 In effect, a technical
jury of scientists passes judgment on the probative value of the evidence
before it is presented to a lay jury, which might be unduly swayed by the
perceived infallibility of "science., 135  Thus, under the Frye test, when
scientists generally accept that novel scientific techniques are reliable, courts
conclude that the techniques produce admissible evidence. 36
When evaluating highly technical procedures such as DNA tests, courts
often require a high degree of acceptance by scientists. 137 Both courts and
133. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. In its opinion, the Frye court rejected the defendant's
attempt to introduce the results of a lie-detector test and stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from
a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. Evaluating the qualifications of testifying experts and determining the relevant
scientific community are problems under both the Frye and Federal Rules tests, and
are discussed infra at notes 165-84 and accompanying text.
134. See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(scientists are those most qualified to assess reliability).
135. People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (Mich. 1977). Other justifications
in favor of the Frye test are as follows. First, the Frye test ensures that a minimum
pool of experts will be available to assess the novel scientific technique's reliability.
See infra notes 165-84 and accompanying text. Second, a preliminary Frye hearing
prevents the trial from becoming a time-consuming trial of the technique itself. Reed
v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 371-72 (Md. 1978).
136. Though courts usually examine only the degree of scientific acceptance,
sometimes they also examine whether the techniques are reliable, that is, empirically
valid. See, e.g., United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 n.12 (6th Cir.) (general
acceptance is nearly synonymous with reliability; if a scientific process is reliable or
sufficiently accurate, courts may deem it generally accepted), cert denied, 422 U.S.
1042 (1975); State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 85 (Iowa 1980) (general acceptance is not
required for admission if the reliability of evidence is otherwise established). These
cases demonstrate that judges sometimes do not apply the Frye test when they feel it
deprives the jury of reliable evidence, but instead directly assess the reliability of the
technique themselves.
137. A strict standard of general acceptance is appropriate with complex scientific
procedures because the jury is likely to accept them without critical scrutiny. See
generally supra notes 109-30 and accompanying text. The Frye test does not quantify
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juries lack the technical expertise to independently evaluate reliability.
Instead, they must depend on expert testimony and thus require that the basis
for the expert testimony is well-accepted by scientists as reliable. Therefore,
proponents of DNA tests should expect that under the Frye test courts will
require a broad level of scientific acceptance of DNA tests.
B. The Federal Rules Test
The principal alternative to the Frye test is the test embodied in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which favor the admission of all relevant
evidence. 138  Under the Federal Rules test, courts treat scientific evidence
like any other expert testimony. 3 9 Expert testimony is admissible if it is
probative, but courts may refuse to admit expert testimony if the dangers of
admitting it substantially outweigh its probative value.
40
To be probative, expert testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact'4 '
and the evidence must be relevant.'42 In addition, the experts must be
the amount of scientific acceptance needed to establish reliability. Different
jurisdictions require varying degrees of general acceptance, although most courts
apparently recognize that some divergence of views among scientists is inevitable.
See, e.g., United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45, 49 (4th Cir. 1984) (substantial
acceptance); United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d
1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (acceptance must be "common to many, or the greatest number;
widespread; prevalent; extensive though not universal."); People v. Guerra, 690 P.2d
635, 656 (Cal. 1984) (acceptance by a "clear majority"); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 327
N.E.2d 671, 678 n.6 (Mass. 1975) ("a degree of scientific divergence of view is
inevitable").
138. FED. R. EvID. 401, 403, 702, 703.
139. MCCORMICK, supra note 125, § 203, at 605.
140. FED. R. EVID. 403, 702.
141. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
Helpfulness to the trier of fact thus requires that the expert's testimony help the
jury and that the expert is sufficiently qualified. In determining helpfulness, courts
also look to the degree that the expert's testimony invades the province of the jury.
See, e.g., State v. Black, 745 P.2d 12, 19 (Wash. 1987) (expert testimony on rape
trauma syndrome is merely an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant, thereby
invading the exclusive province of the finder of fact).
142. FED. R. EVID. 401. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
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qualified 143 and the basis for their testimony must be reasonably relied upon
by experts14 1 in the particular field to which the scientific technique be-
longs.
145
Because the Federal Rules of Evidence require that the basis for expert
testimony be reasonably relied upon by qualified experts, the Federal Rules
test, like the Frye test, requires some degree of scientific acceptance of novel
scientific techniques. 46 As under the Frye test, acceptance by scientists
ensures that the scientific techniques are reliable. The Federal Rules test,
however, is not identical to the Frye test of general acceptance, but is a more
lenient standard that favors the admissibility of scientific evidence.
147
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence allow courts to exclude relevant
scientific evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
dangers of unfair prejudice or confusion, 141 courts that apply the Federal
Rules test often apply a liberal admissibility standard and admit scientific
evidence.'49 These courts rely on trial safeguards to offset any dangers and
143. FED. R. EvID. 702. Whether experts are qualified seems to require a
separate inquiry from the question of whether courts should admit the results of novel
scientific techniques. However, courts cannot determine the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence without examining expert qualifications and the basis for expert
opinion. See generally WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, para. 702[04], at 702-23 (1986).
144. FED. R. EVID. 703. Rule 703 states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at
or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Rules 401 and 702 allow experts to testify about almost anything that is helpful
and relevant. Rule 703 covers the permissible basis for an expert's opinion: expert
opinion may be based on sources of information that are otherwise inadmissible
(because of hearsay or other evidentiary rules) as long as the expert's reliance is
reasonable. FED. R. EVID. 703.
145. The evaluation of expert qualifications and the definition of the relevant
scientific community are concerns under both the Frye and Federal Rules tests and are
discussed infra at notes 165-84 and accompanying text.
146. Paul C. Gianelli, TheAdmissibility ofNovel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. U.S.,
a Half Century Later, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1239-45 (1980).
147. MCCORMICK, supra note 125, § 203, at 608-09; cf. State v. Hall, 297
N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980) (general acceptance is not required to admit novel scientific
evidence if reliability is otherwise established), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981).
148. FED. R. EVID. 403.
149. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (scientific
evidence seems mystically infallible to a lay jury); People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240,
1245 (Cal. 1976) (misleading aura of certainty often envelops a new scientific process).
Jurors similarly may accept without critical scrutiny the testimony of highly qualified
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presume that the jury can evaluate the evidence's reliability.5 0 Trial
safeguards include notice that the test was administered, discovery of test
results, cross-examination of experts, use of opposing experts, and cautionary
instructions to the jury.
Thus, novel scientific techniques can appear reliable under the Federal
Rules test even if they do not have an established track record in the scientific
community."5 ' Conceivably, application of the Federal Rules test could
result in the admission of any relevant evidence supported by qualified expert
testimony unless the dangers of prejudice or confusion are overwhelming.'52
Accordingly, courts that apply the Federal Rules test may admit the results of
DNA tests more readily than courts that apply the Frye test.
Nevertheless, under the Federal Rules test, courts might not apply a
lenient admissibility test but instead might rigorously evaluate whether DNA
tests are reliable. Courts might conclude that a heightened inquiry is
appropriate because jurors, lacking technical expertise, tend to accept highly
technical procedures without critical scrutiny and cannot assess reliability.
153
experts, such as DNA experts, who often have impressive credentials. See id. at 1245
(jurors "give considerable weight to 'scientific evidence' when presented by 'experts'
with impressive credentials"); Smith v. United States, 389 A.2d 1356, 1359 (D.C.
1978) (air of authority surrounds expert opinion), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1983).
150. Data generated by scientific procedures may possess an unwarranted air of
certainty even though humans interpret the data. An example is the polygraph, where
a juror may assume that because a polygraph reliably measures physiological
responses, the interpretation linking those responses to the subject's truthfulness also
is accurate. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975)
(polygraph evidence is shrouded with an aura of infallibility "akin to the ancient oracle
of Delphi").
151. Jurors tend to be impressed by probabilities, so it is important that these
probabilities be reliable. Lawrence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1331 (1971).
152. Courts may criticize the name of the DNA tests. See e.g., United States v.
Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 465 n.1 (4th Cir.) (the term "voiceprint" suggests an air of
accuracy that is unjustified and unwarranted), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); State
v. Coolidge, 260 A.2d 547, 560-61 (N.H. 1969) (hair analysis rejected in part because
it was presented as being as infallible as fingerprints), rev'd on other grounds, 403
U.S. 443 (1971); State v. Black, 745 P.2d 12, 19 (Wash. 1987) (the term "rape trauma
syndrome" creates an aura of reliability and suggests that the alleged victim was in fact
raped and that the defendant is guilty of the crime).
153. Although all federal courts must follow the Federal Rules of Evidence, some
federal courts (or state courts that apply state evidence rules) also apply the Frye test
so that novel scientific techniques must meet the standards of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and be based on a generally accepted scientific theory. See, e.g., United
States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978).
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DNA tests involve complex scientific procedures"5 4 that are explained in
terms of probabilities. 5 5 Even the names of the tests-"DNA fingerprinting"
or "DNA prints"-possess an air of certainty and reliability. Under the
Federal Rules test, then, courts may well apply a Frye-type standard and
rigorously review whether DNA tests are reliable.
Thus, courts that apply the Federal Rules test might apply a strict Frye-
type admissibility standard to DNA tests or they might apply a lenient
standard to admit the test results as long as they are supported by qualified
expert testimony.'56 The following section contains an analysis of whether
DNA test results are admissible under either a lenient test or a strict Frye
analysis.'57
The ambiguity of Rule 703's reasonable reliance standard may be one reason the
federal courts continue to apply the Frye test or apply a stricter admissibility standard
when the evidence is highly technical. See supra note 144 (discussing the ambiguity
of Rule 703). Because the determination of "reasonable reliance under rule 702 is
ambiguous and within the trial court's discretion, it is difficult to predict how critically
courts that apply the Federal Rules test will evaluate DNA tests. See supra note 143.
154. Data generated by scientific procedures may possess an unwarranted air of
certainty even though humans interpret the data. An example is the polygraph, where
a juror may assume that because a polygraph reliably measures physiological
responses, the interpretation linking those responses to the subject's truthfulness is also
accurate. See, e.g., Alexander, 526 F.2d at 168 (polygraph evidence is shrouded with
an aura of infallibility "akin to the ancient oracle of Delphi").
155. Jurors tend to be impressed by probabilities, so it is important that these
probabilities be reliable. Tribe, supra note 151, at 1331.
156. Although all federal courts must follow the Federal Rules of Evidence, some
federal courts (or state courts that apply state evidence rule) also apply the Frye test
so that novel scientific techniques must meet the standards of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and be based on a generally accepted scientific theory. See, e.g., Kilgus, 571
F.2d at 510.
The ambiguity of Rule 703's reasonable reliance standard may be one reason that
federal courts continue to apply the Frye test or apply a stricter admissibility standard
when the evidence is highly technical. See supra note 144 (discussing ambiguity in
Rule 703). Because the determination of "reasonable reliance" under Rule 702 is
ambiguous and is within the trial court's discretion, it is difficult to predict how
critically courts that apply the Federal Rules test will evaluate DNA tests. Id.
157. In this section, the discussion of whether DNA test results are admissible
under the Federal Rules test is limited to the lenient Federal Rules test. The
determination of admissibility under a stricter, Frye-type Federal rules test is covered
in the discussion of admissibility under the Frye test.
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C. Admissibility of DNA Test Results
Under both the Frye and Federal Rules tests, courts probably will
evaluate whether DNA test results are admissible by examining the soundness
of the underlying scientific principle that explains DNA tests and the
reliability of the test that applies the scientific principle. 58 In addition, each
DNA test introduced as evidence must be administered properly, 159 but
challenges to proper administration go towards the weight given to the
evidence, not towards the evidence's admissibility) 60
1. Soundness of the Underlying Scientific Principle
The beginning of this Comment established that the underlying scientific
principle of DNA tests, that individuals have unique DNA patterns, is
uniformly accepted by geneticists, medical researchers, and other scien-
tists. 16' Their research and routine analysis of DNA confirm the principle
that each individual's DNA is unique and is transmitted from generation to
generation162 Their research also confirms that DNA can be isolated from
a variety of biological sources, sorted by electrophoresis, and analyzed with
radioactive probes to identify specific molecular patterns in the DNA.
16
Thus, scientists agree that it is theoretically possible to identify
individuals from their unique DNA patterns. Because the underlying scientific
principle is generally accepted, thereby meeting both the Frye and Federal
158. See, e.g., Kilgus, 571 F.2d at 510 (admission of evidence from infrared
tracking device predicated on the reliability of the underlying theory and the technique
applying the theory); City of Seattle v. Peterson, 693 P.2d 757, 758 (Wash. Ct. App.
1985) (admission of radar evidence requires a valid scientific principle and evidence
that the machine reliably employs the scientific principle).
159. See Gianelli, supra note 146, at 1201. Proper application of a particular test
requires equipment that is in good condition, adherence to proper procedures, and
qualified persons performing the test and interpreting the results. Id. at 1201-02. The
difference between a reliable test and proper application of the test is that a reliable
test requires standardized procedures that produce replicable results while proper
testing on the particular occasion requires adherence to those standardized procedures.
160. Once a court accepts a novel scientific test as reliable, evidence derived from
it must still meet the standards applied to the determination of the admissibility of
other evidence. See MCCORMICK, supra note 125, § 203, at 605.
161. Because it is difficult to dispute commonly-recognized genetics principles,
courts probably will not dispute the underlying scientific principles of DNA tests but
instead may decide to review only the use of DNA tests in crime-solving or paternity
discriminations.
162. Supra note 5 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
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Rules tests, the pertinent inquiry becomes whether DNA tests employ this
theory reliably in forensic situations.
2. Reliability of DNA Tests in Forensic Situations
In evaluating the reliability of novel scientific techniques, courts generally
look to three sources: expert testimony from the relevant scientific communi-
ty, scientific and legal writings, and judicial opinions from other jurisdic-
tions.164 This section contains an analysis of whether these sources establish
the reliability of forensic DNA tests. Because courts require thorough testing
of scientific techniques, this section also reviews the extent to which DNA
tests have been empirically validated.
a. Expert Testimony
DNA tests are so technical that courts cannot independently assess their
reliability. Instead, they must depend on testifying experts.' 65 Thus, courts,
regardless of whether they apply the Frye or Federal Rules test, probably will
not evaluate the content of the expert testimony on DNA, but instead will
require the testifying experts to be highly qualified.'" To date, the experts
that have testified in DNA cases have been well-qualified molecular biologists
who are experienced in the use and analysis of DNA. 67 This section
identifies the concerns that courts may have with the qualifications of experts
in future DNA cases.
In general, two types of experts are likely to testify as to the reliability
of DNA tests: molecular biologists from the laboratories that perform the
164. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985) (applied the Federal
Rules test; enumerated factors that courts may consider when determining the
reliability of novel scientific techniques including the level of acceptance in the
scientific community, the testifying expert's qualifications, the existence of specialized
literature dealing with the technique, the use that has been made of the technique,
expert testimony in previous cases, the novelty of the technique, frequency and type
of error, and the existence of testing standards).
Under the Frye test, judicial reliance on a previous court's finding of general
acceptance may undercut the rationale that those who are most qualified to assess
reliability should do so, although presumably the other jurisdictions have heard expert
testimony from those scientists. See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
165. See United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510,513 (D. Md. 1973) ("It is the
rare attorney who knows as much as the expert.").
166. Experts must be qualified to testify about a particular technique by
knowledge, skill, training, or education. FED. R. EVID. 702.
167. Beeler & Wiebe, supra note 3, at 940 n.189.
[Vol. 57
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss2/9
DNA TESTING
DNA test, and molecular biologists from the academic community.' 68 Both
have advantages and disadvantages.
Laboratory molecular biologists who testify are generally familiar with
the laboratory facilities, the testing standards, and the type of DNA test used
on the sample. These experts perform or supervise numerous tests and have
valuable experience with forensic samples gathered under field conditions.
Nevertheless, courts may conclude that the testimony of laboratory experts is
tainted. The experts have intimate connections with the laboratories and
financial interests in the DNA tests, and often their reputations and careers are
built on the success of the tests and the admissibility of test results.
Consequently, their testimony is susceptible to charges of bias.169 Thus,
168. The FBI is currently testing the reliability of DNA tests. Molecular
biologists from the FBI are qualified to testify, although courts may not allow
testimony as to reliability from other forensic scientists. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
169. For example, molecular biologists from Lifecodes, Cellmark Diagnostics, and
Forensic Science Associates all have personal interests in the judicial acceptance of
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courts may discount their testimony 17 as to the reliability of DNA tests17'
and look to the academic community to assess the tests impartially. 172
Molecular biologists from the academic community are preferable as
reliability experts because they have no financial interests in DNA testing.'"
They are likely to be knowledgeable about lab procedures and use similar tests
in their research. Thus, they have the necessary background to evaluate
whether DNA tests identify individuals accurately and whether forensic
laboratory procedures are accepted as proper by the greater scientific
community. One drawback of academic molecular biologists is that they may
lack first-hand experience as to the reliability of the particular type of forensic
DNA test being offered as evidence, 174 and they may be unfamiliar with the
170. Courts might avoid the effects of biased testimony by appointing their own
experts under FED. R. EVID. 706. Sometimes courts do not necessarily require an
unbiased expert. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267, 1279-80
(E.D.N.Y. 1985 ) (expert testimony may have been influenced by personal interest, but
the court found this interest bore on weight, not admissibility), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988). Some courts, however, have admitted
new scientific evidence only upon testimony given by impartial, disinterested experts.
Courts are particularly concerned when the expert developed the technique and profits
by it. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976) (reliability of voiceprints cannot be
established by individuals whose careers depend on it); People v. Young, 391 N.W.2d
270, 274-75 (Mich. 1986) (general acceptance of electrophoresis method of blood
typing must be established by disinterested and impartial experts; court excluded
reliability testimony by two prosecution experts who were full-time employees of law
enforcement agencies). Courts may worry that personal bias of the examiners can
presuppose the outcome of the test. People v. Monigan, 390 N.E.2d 562, 568-69 (111.
App. Ct. 1979) (subjectiveness surrounds the interpretation of polygraph results; claims
of accuracy for the technique seem to come only from the polygraph examiners
themselves).
171. If courts determine that DNA test results are admissible, the testimony of
laboratory experts is still necessary to demonstrate that the actual test, whose results
are being.offered as evidence, was administered properly. This testimony goes to the
weight given to the evidence, not to its reliability. See generally supra notes 133-57
and accompanying text.
172. Young, 391 N.W.2d at 276-77 (admitted nonforensic scientists as experts on
DNA testing because they had the understanding and experience to evaluate the
evidence).
173. See id. at 275-76 (a certain degree of interest must be tolerated if scientists
familiar with a technique are to testify at all; allowed testimony from defense expert
who opposed an electrophoresis technique, was an original developer of the technique
but withdrew from the project, and was possibly seeking vindication; did not allow
testimony from those whose livelihood depends on the success of the technique).
174. Different forensic labs, such as Lifecodes and Cellmark, use different types
of DNA tests. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
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forensic laboratory's capabilities and procedures. 175 The academic experts
can remedy these deficiencies by familiarizing themselves with the lab
facilities, the testing standards, and the type of DNA test used.
Both types of experts should testify as to the reliability of current DNA
tests. Their combined testimony maximizes the trier of fact's knowledge of
the reliability of forensic DNA testing and minimizes the adverse effects of
biased testimony. 76 A broader base of experts also ensures that the defense
has access to experts to rebut the testimony of the prosecution's experts.'77
175. Some courts have defined expertise as direct and empirical experience, and
have excluded those with only theoretical knowledge. See Commonwealth v. Lykus,
327 N.E.2d 671 (Mass. 1975) (voiceprints); see also United States v. Henerdshot, 614
F.2d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 1980) (admitted shoeprint-lifting technique based on expert
testimony by crime technicians); People v. Williams, 331 P.2d 251 (Cal. Ct. App.
1958) (medical profession unfamiliar with narcotics test; court selected the relevant
community as those who would be expected to be familiar with its use and admitted
the test).
Narrowly defining the field of experts as only those actually using a particular
DNA test may result in a community of biased experts. An expert who develops a
technique and profits by it may "accept" it without regard for its reliability. Thus,
courts infrequently use this approach. See Young, 391 N.W.2d at 277 (academic
geneticists, though unfamiliar with evidentiary bloodstain analysis, need only to explain
the gaps in their knowledge for their judgment to be respected).
176. The combined testimony thus ensures that the testimony of "interested"
experts can be corroborated. The bigger pool of experts also can demonstrate to courts
that DNA tests have been generally accepted by a larger scientific discipline than the
handful of molecular biologists who perform forensic DNA tests. See Young, 391
N.W.2d at 276-77 (because the community of scientists having direct empirical
experience with electrophoresis of evidentiary bloodstains did not seem sufficiently
large to reach the Frye objective of general acceptance, the court looked to nonforensic
scientists using the test because they had the understanding and experience to evaluate
the evidence). Courts may be lenient in admitting expert testimony when the defense
has profferred experts to show lack of scientific acceptance. See State v. Chatman,
383 A.2d 440, 442 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (allowed expert with no practical
experience to testify about atomic absorption spectometry because he had read all
scientific literature and was familiar with the problems of the technique).
177. Only a few commercial laboratories perform DNA tests, so there are not
many laboratory molecular biologists who can testify. Not all courts, however, are
concerned with the availability of defense experts. See United States v. Franks, 511
F.2d 25, 33 (6th Cir.) (admitted voiceprints in part because of the absence of defense
experts), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). Lack of defense experts may signal lack
of funds, not lack of expert opposition. While the state has access to forensic
laboratories and outside experts, the defense may not be able to afford experts.
Arguably, if the state intends to use DNA tests, it should pay for the tests for indigent
defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 1970) (if the
government uses neutron activation analysis, an expensive fact-finding tool, it must pay
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Courts might'not allow molecular biologists to testify about statistical
frequencies, 78 which may be outside the scope of their expertise. 79  One
solution is to retain genetic statisticians to testify regarding genetic marker
frequencies. Many molecular biologists have some formal training in
statistics, however, which should be sufficient to allow them to explain the
DNA tests in terms of statistics. 8
Finally, once courts determine that a particular DNA test is reliable,
technicians with a lower level of education, such as a bachelor of science
for the tests for indigent defendants), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
A related concern is that the defense must have notice that the prosecution has
run a DNA test. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1969)
(neutron activated analysis was conducted after discovery; new trial ordered so defense
could run its own tests).
The defense may also assert a right to retest samples. In Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court recognized a limited right to discover exculpatory
evidence in the prosecution's possession. Some courts have considered whether this
right translates into a right to retest samples or have evidence presented. See McNutt
v. Superior Court, 648 P.2d 122 (Ariz. 1982) (blood samples must be preserved and
disclosed). But cf California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984) (no duty to
preserve breath samples; intoxilyzer is so accurate that preservation is not likely to be
exculpatory).
The defense similarly may challenge the loss or destruction of biological evidence
or the failure to conduct tests. Most courts have not imposed a duty to take samples
or run tests, although when a reliable and potentially exculpatory test exists, arguably
such a duty should be imposed. See, e.g., United States v. Henson, 486 F.2d 1292,
1298 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (no right to fingerprint analysis when police failed to
perform analysis; court held that defendant had a duty to make the hands available for
testing); People v. Robinson, 265 N.E.2d 543 (N.Y. 1970) (prosecution tested semen
for blood type but failed to make potentially exculpatory test; court held that the
defendant was denied due process when his motion for the exculpatory test was
denied); see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (per se state rule barring all
hypnotically refreshed testimony by defendants is unconstitutional in light of present
scientific knowledge).
178. See supra notes 109-30 and accompanying text (discussing the admissibility
of statistical evidence).
179. See, e.g., State v. Garrison, 585 P.2d 563 (Ariz. 1978) (Gordon, J.,
dissenting). In Garrison, the expert testified that there was an eight in one million
chance that teeth marks were not made by the suspect. The dissent noted, "[Wihile
Dr. Campbell may have a great deal of expertise in the actual comparison techniques
of bite-mark identification, he is totally out of his field when the discussion turns to
probability theory." Id. at 568; see also Dennis S. Karjala, Comment, The Evidentiary
Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, 59 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1031 (1971) (the
qualifications of experts as chemists do not necessarily establish their competence to
explain the statistical relevance of their tests).
180. See generally Weinstein, supra note 143, para. 702[04], at 702-21 to 702-29.
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degree, are probably qualified to testify that they conducted DNA tests for the
presence of DNA bands, found bands in specific locations, and calculated the
percentage of the population that possess those bands.'8 ' In short, these
technicians are qualified to determine whether DNA tests have been properly
administered according to established procedures, which goes to the weight of
the evidence. These technicians, however, are not qualified to determine
whether DNA tests are significantly reliable so that the test results are
adumissible. The expertise of molecular biologists is necessary to assess the
reliability and admissibility of DNA tests, testing procedures, and population
frequencies. Accordingly, under both the Frye and Federal Rules tests,
proponents of DNA tests will make persuasive presentations as to reliability
by using molecular biologists as experts. 8 '
Although courts rely primarily on expert testimony in determining
reliability,8 3 DNA tests must be accepted as reliable by a larger group in the
scientific community than just the experts who testify for admissibility. 18 4
Scientific and legal writings may augment expert testimony to show the level
of acceptance.
181. Id.
182. Some courts require a high level of expertise. See People v. Young, 391
N.W.2d 270, 290 (Mich. 1986) (Boyle, J., dissenting) (for blood-typing case, majority
allowed as experts only scientists, not technicians). But cf State v. Crowder, 203
S.E.2d 38, 44 (N.C. 1974) (allowed forensic chemist with bachelor's of science and
master's of science degrees and only 50 semester hours of chemistry to testify about
atomic absorption spectrometry).
183. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
184. Under either the Frye or Federal Rules test, courts should not admit DNA
tests based on a single expert's testimony, although a single expert probably could
testify that a test is accepted by the scientific community. Cf., e.g., United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985) (under the Federal Rules test, a
technique that has attracted only minimal support is likely to be found unreliable);
People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1248 (Cal. 1976) (questioned whether the testimony
of a single witness is ever sufficient to represent general scientific acceptance); State
v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 981 (La. 1979) (under the Federal Rules test, the
testimony of a single expert is not enough to admit polygraph evidence) Burkett v.
Northern, 715 P.2d 1159 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (one physician's testimony does not
establish general acceptance of thermography because he failed to give numbers of
supporters or publications supporting his statements).
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b. Scientific and Legal Writings
A review of scientific literature confirms that individuals have unique
DNA patterns and that forensic DNA tests can identify individuals reli-
ably.'85 Most literature concerning the forensic use of DNA tests, however,
is generated by commercial labs and other proponents of forensic DNA
testing.ls 6 The literature thus is susceptible to the same charges of bias as
is the testimony of experts from the commercial laboratories. 8 7
Nevertheless, these articles are relevant for several reasons. First, they
discuss problems, techniques, and testing methods that are unique to the
forensic use of DNA tests.ss Second, forensic journals offer the best
opportunity for peer review and criticism of the various DNA tests.'89
Finally, because the authors of forensic articles concur that DNA tests are
reliable, these articles suggest that the tests have achieved a certain level of
scientific acceptance."*4 This acceptance, if supported by adequate empirical
185. See generally supra note 8 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Peter Gill, Forensic Application of DNA 'Fingerprints', 318
NATURE 577 (1985). Peter Gill is a scientist with the Home Offices's Central
Research Establishment in the United Kingdom (an agency similar to the FBI's crime
lab).
187. As a result, a court may attach more importance to the published articles of
academics, whose livelihoods do not depend on the success of DNA tests. See supra
notes 17-41 and accompanying text.
188. In the context of blood typing, one commentator has suggested that courts
should be careful in assessing the adequacy of studies regarding the effects of forensic
conditions (such as the effects of age and contamination of blood) because the studies
often are conducted by interested parties such as law enforcement agencies (or, in the
case of DNA tests, commercial laboratories). See Randolph N. Jonakait, Will Blood
Tell? Genetic Markers in Criminal Cases, 31 EMORY L.J. 833 (1982).
189. Peer review journals are useful to impeach the credibility of expert witnesses
or establish general acceptance because "a high standard of accuracy is engendered by
various factors: the treatise is written primarily . .. for professionals, subject to
scrutiny and exposure for inaccuracy, with the reputation of the writer at stake." FED.
R. EVID 803 advisory committee note (learned treatises exception to the hearsay rule).
190. Because subsequent research often is reported only if there are inconsisten-
cies or new findings, scientific literature does not document all research regarding the
reliability of forensic DNA tests. Therefore, lack of refutation can be significant.
David D. Dixon, Note, The Admissibility of Electrophoresis Methods of Genetic
Marker Bloodstain Typing Under the Frye Standard, 11 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 773,
787 (1986). However, the numerous nonforensic scientific articles regarding DNA
testing may allay this concern.
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testing, may meet the general acceptance 'test of the Frye test.9. and the
more lenient Federal Rules test.
Although courts also may review legal writings to establish whether a
technique has been accepted by scientists, 192 commentators have not
addressed the forensic use of DNA tests in any comprehensive detail. The
legal literature that is available does support the admissibility of DNA test
results.
c. Historical Development
Currently, the great majority of courts that have dealt with the issue of
DNA fingerprinting have held that such evidence is admissible, whether under
the Frye test 93 or under the Federal Rules test. 94 In addition, some states
have begun legislating evidentiary statutes that make DNA evidence
admissible.195 This section will discuss the evolution of DNA admissibility
and highlight key decisions since its introduction in the United States federal
and state courts.
(1) People v. Wesley 96
People v. Wesley involved a defendant charged with second degree
burglary and with second degree murder. The prosecution sought to compare
DNA found in bloodstained clothing retrieved from the defendant with DNA
recovered from the deceased victim. 9 7 Additionally, the prosecution sought
191. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
192. See supra note 188.
193. See e.g., Snowden v. State, 574 So. 2d 960, 966 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990);
Smith v. Deppish, 807 P.2d 144, 159 (Kan. 1991); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422,
426 (Minn. 1989); State v. Davis, No. 71694, 1991 WL 134460 (Mo. July 26, 1991);
Mandujano v. State, 799 S.W.2d 318, 321-22 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Glover v. State,
787 S.W.2d 544, 547-48 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
194. See, e.g., King v. State, No. 05-90-00905-CR, 1991 WL 122396 (Tex. Ct.
App. July 8, 1991); Burleson v. State, 802 S.W.2d 429, 441 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991);
Kelly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
195. See e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-13(b) (Bums 1991) (in criminal trial,
DNA evidence is admissible without antecedent expert testimony that DNA evidence
is reliable identification method); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.441.1 (West Supp. 1989)
(providing for admissibility of DNA evidence); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 10-915(c) (1989) (setting forth requirements to offer DNA evidence in a criminal
proceeding); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.25 (West 1991) (in civil or criminal proceeding,
DNA evidence admissible without antecedent expert testimony).
196. 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Co. Ct. 1988).
197. Id. at 643.
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to compare the DNA from the bloodstained clothing with DNA to be extracted
from defendant Wesley through a blood sample. 198
In Wesley, the court recognized Frye v. United States'" as the ultimate
standard for the admission of scientific evidence.2° In Frye, the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.201
People v. Middleton2 2 further refined the Frye standard, stating "... the test
is not whether a particular procedure is unanimously endorsed by the scientific
community, but whether it is generally acceptable as reliable.,
20 3
In Wesley, the court held that DNA fingerprinting satisfied the Frye
standard because it is a scientific test that is reliable and has gained general
acceptance in the scientific community.2°  In fact, not a single witness
challenged the reliability or general acceptance of the DNA fingerprinting
procedures.20 5  The thrust of the defense's argument hinged on two
propositions: (1) inadequacy of laboratory procedures, methodology, and
quality control; and (2) inadequacy of the statistical analysis used to determine
whether two samples match.2°
The court rejected each of the defense's arguments.20 7 The significance
of this case, however, lies in the types of arguments made by the defense.
The defense did not attempt to attack the evidentiary value of DNA finger-
printing. They attempted instead to establish inadequate laboratory protocol
and statistical analysis. These arguments are important because, as will be
discussed further, DNA fingerprinting will undoubtedly become fixed in our
courts and the only available arguments to keep DNA fingerprint evidence out
198. Id.
199. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
200. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
201. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
202. 429 N.E.2d 100 (N.Y. 1981).
203. Id. at 103.
204. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 650.
207. Id. at 659.
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of court will center around those made by the defense in Wesley.2"s In fact,
United States v. Two Bulls,209 the first federal appellate decision on the
admissibility of DNA fingerprint evidence, correctly held that the issue is not
whether to use the Frye standard, or the Relevancy test, but whether the
proper laboratory procedures were followed.
(2) Andrews v. State2"'
In Andrews v. State, the defendant faced sexual battery and other charges
in a burglary-related rape.2" Over defendant's objection, the state presented
DNA fingerprint evidence that matched defendant's DNA structure.212 The
sample came from a vaginal swab of the victim. 213  The defendant was
convicted and subsequently appealed, contending that the trial court had
abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the results of an unreliable
DNA fingerprint test.214 The court of appeals unanimously held that the
DNA evidence was sufficiently relevant to be admissible under Floridg Rules
of Evidence.215
In the instant case, the Florida Court of Appeal for the Fifth District
chose not to apply the Frye standard. 16 Instead, the court endorsed the
relevancy test217 for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Although the defendant challenged the admissibility of the specific DNA test
administered to him, 218 the court found that the novelty of DNA fingerprint
evidence called for re-examination of both the specific administration of the
test and the general theory supporting it.
2 19
To determine the general admissibility of DNA print evidence, the court
first studied the Florida standard for admissibility of scientific evidence
22
208. Of course, here the author refers to arguments as to the evidentiary standards
used to determine whether novel scientific evidence is admissible. Other attacks upon
admissibility, such as constitutional attacks, remain viable alternatives.
209. 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990).
210. 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
211. Id. at 842.
212. Id at 843.
213. Id.
214. Id at 842-43.
215. Id at 851.
216. Id at 846-47.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 843. Defendant's test was administered by Lifecodes Corporation.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 843-47.
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and confessed its uncertainty as to Frye's status in Florida.22 The Florida
Supreme Court had neither accepted nor rejected Frye,2 2 while at least two
district courts of appeal had explicitly or implicitly adopted a relevancy
test.2 3 In recommending that Florida follow the relevancy test, the court
reasoned that an approach based on the Federal Rules would, like Frye,
prevent the admission into evidence of unreliable testimony, but would be less
likely than Frye to exclude reliable testimony." 4
The general acceptance standard articulated in Frye rests on the tacit
assumption that only the scientific community may properly evaluate the
reliability of scientific evidence." 5 As a result, Frye's general acceptance
test requires courts to delegate their authority to evaluate the reliability of
proffered evidence when that evidence is scientific evidence. However, Frye
provided no guidelines for identifying either general acceptance or the relevant
scientific field." 6
The court's test is based on Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403.227
Under this test, the court must determine that the proffered evidence is
sufficiently reliable and material to the jury's resolution of factual dis-
putes. 228 Evidence meeting this criteria is admissible unless its probative
value is substantially outweighed by its potential to overwhelm, confuse, or
mislead the jury.2 29 Under this approach, lack of general acceptance does
not cause inadmissibility per se, but weighs in the determination of whether
the evidence is sufficiently reliable to assist the fact finder."
221. Id. at 843.
222. Id. at 844-45.
223. Id. at 844-46. Those courts were the First District Court of Appeal in Brown
v. State, 426 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) and the Fourth District Court of
Appeal in Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
224. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 846-47.
225. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1235-37 (3d Cir. 1984).
226. Id. at 1236.
227. Federal Rule 702 covers expert testimony. "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
Federal Rule 403 explains when relevant evidence may be excluded. "Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
228. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1242.
229. Id. at 1237.
230. Id. at 1238.
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Thus, having endorsed the relevancy test, the instant court then applied
the test to determine the admissibility of DNA print evidence."' The court
first examined the qualifications of the expert witnesses, all of whom testified
for the state.2 2 The court next considered the indicia of reliability of DNA
print testing z3 Testimony at trial revealed that DNA print testing had been
in existence for ten years, its results were routinely used in other disciplines,
and the procedure was generally accepted in the scientific community."
Finally, the court analyzed the procedures in the DNA test administered to
appellant, and found each of appellant's allegations of methodological flaws
to be without merit.15 The court observed that if the DNA test is improper-
ly administered, it ordinarily yields no result rather than an incorrect
result.1 6 Appellant's inability to produce experts to testify against the DNA
test administered to him further weakened his case.
237
Returning to the question of the admissibility of DNA-print evidence in
general, the instant court found that such evidence met the standards for
admissibility imposed by Florida's version of Federal Rule 702." First, the
court found the witnesses qualified as. experts. Second, the DNA-print test
results were helpful to the jury.239 The only remaining portion of the
admissibility inquiry was the determination of whether the potential prejudicial
231. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 849-50.
232. Id. at 847. The examination showed each expert to be experienced and well-
trained. Id.
233. Id. at 847-48.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 848-49.
236. Id. at 849.
237. Id. at 851.
238. Id. at 849-51. FLA. STAT. ch. 90.702 differs from Federal Rule 702, supra
note 143, principally in its final clause: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion; however, the
opinion is admissible only if it can be applied to evidence at trial." FLA. STAT. ch.
90.702 (1987).
239. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 850. It is questionable whether appellant could have
been convicted without the DNA-print evidence. Although appellant matched the
general physical description of the assailant, the victim could not positively identify
appellant. Id. at 842. An analysis of the semen sample taken from the victim revealed
only that appellant's blood type matched that of the assailant. Id. at 842-43. Like 65
percent of the male population, however, appellant had type "0" blood. Id. at 843.
The most damaging circumstantial evidence against appellant was that his fingerprints
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effect of the testimony substantially outweighed its probative value.240 The
court noted that DNA-print testing, unlike fingerprint or bite-mark analysis,
does not permit the fact finder to examine physical evidence and independent-
ly evaluate the expert's conclusions.24' While this feature warranted special
caution, the court found that this alone did not make the evidence so
unreliable as to justify its exclusion.242 Thus, the court in Andrews deemed
DNA fingerprint evidence admissible based on the Federal Rules relevancy
analysis.
(3) United States v. Two Bulls2 4a
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal was going to hear Two Bulls' appeal
en banc; however, the appellant died before rehearing. As a result, the court
off appeals vacated the scheduled rehearing and instructed the trial court to
dismiss the indictment against Two Bulls.2 4 Still, the court of appeals, in
a three-judge panel decision, provided the following three-prong test to be
satisfied before the admission of DNA fingerprint evidence: "(1) whether the
DNA evidence is scientifically acceptable; (2) whether there are certain
standard procedures that should be followed in conducting these tests; and (3)
whether these standards were followed in this case." 245 In the instant case,
the court recognized that the principles imposed for the admissibility of DNA
fingerprint evidence apply regardless of whether the jurisdiction uses the Frye
standard or the relevancy analysis of Federal Rule 702.246 In short, the court
provided that the focal issue when dealing with the admissibility of any
questionable opinion evidence, such as DNA profiling, is whether there has
been proper foundation as to acceptability and reliability.247
(4) Ex parte Perry241
In Perry, the court decided whether DNA evidence, used to identify the
defendant as the perpetrator of a crime, is admissible in Alabama. In its
240. Id. at 849.
241. Id. at 850. The DNA-print test would only allow the jury to observe X-ray
photographs of markings purported to be bands of DNA. ld. at 849.
242. Id. at 850.
243. 918 F.2d 56 (1990).
244. See United States v. Two Bulls, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991).
245. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d at 61.
246. Id. at 60.
247. Id.
248. No. 89-1534, 1991 WL 84132 (Ala. Apr. 19, 1991).
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holding the Alabama Supreme Court advocated a modified Frye test, which
is similar to the test espoused in United States v. Two Bulls:24 9
I. Is there a theory, generally accepted in the scientific community, that
supports the conclusion that DNA forensic testing can produce reliable
results?
II. Are there current techniques that are capable of producing reliable
results in DNA identification and that are generally accepted in the
scientific community?
III. In this particular case, did the testing laboratory perform generally
accepted scientific techniques without error in the performance or interpreta-
tion of the tests?250
The Perry court thus focused on the principal concern surrounding the
admissibility of DNA evidence: "however accepted and proper the scientific
theory underlying DNA evidence analysis is, and however acceptable the
techniques for DNA testing based on that theory, there remains the possibility
for error in the interpretation and performance of the tests."25'
Perry is also significant because it is the first appellate decision that
outlines procedures available to the defendant for challenging DNA evi-
dence. 2  The following guidelines, some of which the court borrowed from
New York v. Castro,5 3 should aid in the determination of the admissibility
of DNA evidence and should help to produce uniformity in DNA evidentiary
hearings:
1. The proponent of the DNA evidence, whether defense or prosecution,
should give discovery to the adversary, which should include, upon request:
a. Copies of autorads, with the opportunity to examine the
originals.
b. Copies of laboratory books.
c. Copies of quality control tests run on material utilized.
d. Copies of reports by the testing laboratory issued to the
proponent.
e. A written report by the testing laboratory setting forth the
mean or average size measurement, if applicable, together with
standard deviation used.
f. A statement setting forth observed contaminants, the reasons
therefore, and tests performed to determine the origin and the
effects thereof.
249. Id. at *8.
250. Id.
251. Id. at *7.
252. Id. at *13.
253. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
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g. If the sample is degraded, a statement setting forth the tests
performed and the results thereof.
h. A statement setting forth any other observed defects or
laboratory errors, the reasons therefore and the effects thereof.
i. Chain of custody documents.
j. A statement by the testing lab, setting forth the method used
to calculate the allele frequency in the relevant population.
k. A copy of the data pool for each loci examined.
1. A certification by the testing lab that the same rule used to
declare a match was used to determine the allele frequency in
the population.
2. The proponent shall have the burden of going forward to establish that
the tests and calculations were properly conducted. Once this burden is
met, the burden of proof shifts to the adversary to prove, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the tests and calculations should be suppressed
or modified. z-4
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF DNA FINGERPRINTING
It is clear that DNA fingerprint evidence, if not already admissible, will
eventually become admissible in all courts. The procedures used in the
scientific analysis are the only issues to raise regarding admissibility. Many
questions remain, however, regarding the constitutionality of DNA evidence
used to convict a criminal defendant. These questions range from Fourth
Amendment and invasion of privacy concerns, to due process concerns arising
out of the right to expert services and the right to retest. Though these issues
do not concern the evidentiary value of DNA fingerprinting, they should be
evaluated during pre-trial motions on the admissibility of the evidence due to
the potential for prejudicial effect on the defendant.
A. DNA Fingerprinting and the Fourth Amendment
From their inception, DNA fingerprints have been obtained primarily
from blood samples. Although other body tissues and fluids are suitable for
DNA testing procedures, blood provides the best sample from which a
successful test result can be obtained25 In many criminal cases, law
enforcement officials have been taking blood samples from defendants to
perform DNA tests. 6
254. Perry, 1991 WL 84132 at *13-14 (citing Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 999).
255. In every criminal case reported that included DNA evidence, blood samples
were used in the DNA test process, though other types of samples may have been
collected.
256. See, e.g., People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Co. Ct. 1988). With respect
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Samples for DNA fingerprinting, however, can also be obtained from
hair, saliva, and skin cells. 7 The Fourth Amendment protections vary for
defendants from whom those samples are taken6 8 Constitutional standards
for Fourth Amendment violations are often influenced by the degree of the
invasion of privacy259 or the means of governmental intrusion6 ° Identifi-
cation procedures must vary with the degree of the privacy intrusion and the
means by which samples are obtained;261 therefore, the standards under
which the Fourth Amendment is satisfied generally depend upon the procedure
utilized.
The constitutional validity of compulsory identification procedures,
utilizing procedures other than blood testing, was recognized in Davis v.
Mississippi.262 Although the Court in Davis held that detention solely for
the purpose of fingerprinting is protected by the Fourth Amendment and thus
requires a warrant, it stated in dictum that
because of the unique nature of the fingerprinting process, such detentions
might, under narrowly defined circumstances, be found to comply with the
Fourth Amendment even though there is not probable cause in the
traditional sense .... Detention for fingerprinting may constitute a much
less serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of police
searches and detentions.
263
to paternity suits, see King v. Tanner, 539 N.Y.S.2d 617, 622 (Sup. Ct. 1989); In re
Adoption of Baby Girl S., 532 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
257. See Lewis, supra note 2, at 47.
258. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizure, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
259. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
260. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (no Fourth Amend-
ment search because there was no privacy intrusion when police officers viewed a barn
from "open fields"); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (aerial surveillance of
backyard does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search).
261. Compelling a lineup, fingerprints, or a voice exemplar is obviously quite
different from compelling a blood sample, plucking pubic hairs, or extracting objects
from a person's body. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
262. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
263. Id. at 727.
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The Court suggested a balancing approach, weighing the police need for the
evidence against the severity of the personal intrusion.2
The Supreme Court took the balancing approach a step further in Hayes
v. Florida.2' The Court held that, without a warrant or probable cause, the
police cannot forcibly take a person from his home and transport him to the
police station for fingerprinting because that would be tantamount to an
arrest.' The Court added, however, that does not imply "that a brief
detention in the field for the purpose of fingerprinting, where there is only
reasonable suspicion not amounting to probable cause, is necessarily
impermissible under the Fourth Amendment." 7 The Court further suggest-
ed that it may be constitutional to seize a person on less than probable cause
and remove him to the police station for fingerprinting under circumscribed
procedures.m The protections of the Fourth Amendment are triggered,
however, if the police activity becomes too intrusive or the stop takes too long
in duration.2 9
When a suspect has blood or skin residue under his fingernails, and the
police have probable cause to believe that such evidence is incriminating, the
exigency of the circumstances vitiates the necessity of a warrant."70 While
probable cause is typically necessary to obtain such a sample, the exigency
presented by the suspect's ability to wash away the evidence excuses the
wirrant requirement.
Constitutional treatment of the collection of hair or saliva samples under
the Fourth Amendment, on the other hand, has been somewhat varied. A
search warrant is usually required if no exigent circumstances are present,
while probable cause alone will suffice if exigent circumstances are found to
exist.271 One state court held that no violation of the Fourth Amendment
occurred when police officers plucked hairs from a defendant's scalp because
the defendant was being arrested and the hairs were in plain view.27
264. Id. at 727-28.
265. 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
266. Id. at 815-16.
267. Id. at 816.
268. Id. at 817.
269. Id. at 815-16.
270. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
271. See, e.g., State v. Ostroski, 518 A.2d 915 (Conn. 1986) (probable cause
required to take a saliva sample because such action constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment); State v. Reeves, 671 P.2d 553 (Kan. 1981) (upon probable cause
supported by a search warrant, state can collect pubic hairs and blood and saliva
samples); Pyle v. State, 645 P.2d 1390 (Okla. 1982) (taking of hair, blood, and saliva
samples, pursuant to a search warrant, is valid under the Fourth Amendment).
272. State v. Sharpe, 200 S.E.2d 44 (N.C. 1973).
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Overall, the validity of the identification procedures is still determined by
balancing the public interest in effective law enforcement against the private
interest in freedom from governmental intrusion.273 In the end, though
probable cause is currently required by most courts for hair and saliva
samples, just as for blood samples, the extraordinary reliability of DNA
fingerprints might prove persuasive in lowering the standard of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment.274
B. The Threat to Privacy
Because law enforcement officials are currently collecting and storing
blood and tissue samples to develop data banks,275 the widespread establish-
ment of such data banks poses a genuine threat to individual privacy.
Through routine administrative procedures, a DNA file containing both
criminal histories and personal genetic information could be compiled
276
without public awareness or consent.277
The proposed DNA data banks represent the equivalent of current
methods of storing criminal information such as the maintenance of fingerprint
files. Fingerprint files are widely accepted and regarded as a valuable tool in
law enforcement. Little protection exists, however, from the improper release
of criminal records, which can often be outdated or contain inaccurate
information.27 Notably, courts have recognized the dangers inherent in
273. See generally Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,619
(1989) (when "special needs" are present, "we have not hesitated to balance the
governmental and privacy interest to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable
cause requirements in the particular context"); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
355 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
274. See Merz, supra note 10 at 2194 ("While a court order is necessary to
require a blood sample, gathering a few hairs in a comb is likely to be considered no
more invasive than pressing fingertips to the ink pad.").
275. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text; see also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 290.2 (West 1988) (providing for computerized data bank); MINN. STAT. § 299C.155
(West Supp. 1991) (providing for DNA analysis data and records).
276. Robin W. White & Jeremy D. Greenwood, DNA Fingerprinting and the Law,
51 MOD. L. REV. 145, 155 (1988).
277. Id.
278. See Ronald L. Doemberg & Donald H. Zeiger, Due Process Versus Data
Processing: An Analysis of Computerized Criminal History Information Systems, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1110 (1980); see also Arthur R. Miller, The Privacy Revolution: A
Report from the Barricades, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 13 (1979) ("One of the most
potentially dangerous kinds of information circulating in the United States is criminal
justice data, much of which is now computerized ... [T]hese records circulate far
beyond the law enforcement environment, even beyond government.").
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keeping arrest records on file.279 These arrest records present potential
threats to individual privacy as well as threats of improper use to harm
individuals. "The seriousness of the arrest record problem, although perhaps
questionable in the past, is now too well documented to be doubted."" 0 If
DNA data banks also maintain criminal histories, then similar dangers of
personal detriment will develop.
DNA data banks, however, differ from other recordkeeping procedures
in that samples of blood and other body tissues containing an individual's
genetic information must be collected and stored. By collecting blood
samples, intimate information such as susceptibility to disease and family
relationships could be released. 28' With this information available, it is
likely that insurance companies, credit companies, and employers would seek
access to their clients' or employees' DNA samples.?
Few protections currently exist to keep genetic information private; as the
use of DNA testing has evolved, no corresponding regulation of the collection,
storage, or use of DNA has developed.23  Because inadequate safeguards
are presently in place for medical records, there are no remedies for the
potential harms that could result from illegal access and unauthorized use of
medical information. s4 In addition, because DNA molecules contain a vast
amount of information, some of which has yet to be deciphered, the potential
harm that may result from access to DNA samples is impossible to pre-
dict.285
279. See, e.g., Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (arrest record
ordered expunged from FBI files; an individual with an arrest record is subject to
closer police scrutiny in the future, and may suffer a detrimental effect on future
employment and licensure for certain professions); Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157
(Colo. 1972) (court recognized right to privacy and ordered expungement of arrest
record).
280. Davidson, 503 P.2d at 159-60.
281. Two examples of potential abuses of DNA blood samples are the disclosure
of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) information and the disclosure of
drug screening test results.
282. See Michaud, supra note 58, § 6, at 88 (predicting insurance and employer
DNA testing for susceptibility to genetic disease).
283. See Janet A. Koleran, Comment, Confidentiality of Genetic Information, 30
UCLA L. REv. 1283 (1983) (explaining common law remedies for breach of genetic
confidentiality within the physician-patient relationship).
284. "Privacy rights of subjects of biomedical research are not adequately
protected by existing statutory and case law. In its present state, the law lacks the
uniformity and certainty required to protect individuals' expectations of privacy and
confidential communications." Bernard R. Adams, Comment, Medical Research and
Personal Privacy, 30 VILL. L. REv. 1077, 11i8-19 (1985).
285. One commentator has questioned possible future uses of DNA fingerprints:
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No court has recognized yet a right to genetic privacy, nor has any
method of enforcement been developed to protect genetic information.2
Legislation providing for the protection of these samples and the information
potentially yielded from these samples must accompany the establishment of
DNA data banks. If states must store blood samples in the interest of
effective law enforcement, they must also provide security for these samples
through strict requirements regarding the usage of and access to these samples.
States must also develop remedies that hold the states responsible for any
harm resulting from unauthorized access to or disclosure of confidential
genetic information. In short, legislators should statutorily recognize and
protect the right to genetic privacy.
C. The Right to Expert Services
The right to expert services is perhaps the most crucial component for an
adequate defense to forestall the introduction of unreliable scientific evidence
as complex and technical as DNA fingerprinting. Defense attorneys are not
equipped to debate the prosecution experts because they do not have the
requisite knowledge and because they cannot testify before the jury.
Courts have found a right to expert services provided by the government
on several constitutional grounds.287 In Ake v. Oklahoma,'m the Supreme
Once DNA analysis comes to be seen as a familiar and benign crime
control tactic, will the way be paved for more controversial uses-for
example, denial of certain types of employment and insurance, or even the
right to have children to those whose genetic makeup indicates they may be
prone to particular illnesses or forms of anti-social behavior?
Marx, supra note 53, at A14.
286. See Vincent M. Brannigan, Biotechnology: A First Order Technico-Legal
Revolution, 16 HOFSTRA L. REv. 545, 572 (1988) (debate over confidentiality in
genetic indicators of disease resulting from advances in DNA analysis); Robert R.
Wachbroit, Making the Grade: Testing for Human Genetic Disorders, 16 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 583 (1988) (discussing issues of access to and confidentiality of information
obtained from genetic screening, rights to genetic information, and employers' use of
genetic information to determine genetic susceptibility to disease).
287. There are five constitutional grounds:
(1) The due process right to present a defense. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.
68 (1985) (denial of defendant's request for a court-appointed expert in psychiatry
deprived due process to a defendant asserting the insanity defense).
(2) The right to equal protection, namely that an indigent defendant should have
the basic tools for an adequate defense to place him on a similar level with the
wealthier defendant. See generally Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (providing an
adequate opportunity to present a defense but not to duplicate the full legal arsenal);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (plurality opinion).
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Court recognized a due process right to a psychiatrist when the defendant's
mental condition is at issue. Many courts have interpreted Ake to require not
simply any expert, but a defense expert; in other words, an independent, non-
government expert who will help the defendant's attorney prepare the defense
and interpret the findings of the prosecution's expert witness.2 , Some
courts have even determined that the expert supplied by the court must be
partisan; that is, it would be considered ineffective assistance of counsel when
a defense attorney relies on the state expert without requesting a defense
expert.
290
Courts do not, however, consider all denials of defense requests for
expert services constitutional violations. There are at least four circumstances
under which courts have denied expert services: (1) where the expert's
information would not be pivotal; (2) where an "impartial" government expert
would suffice; (3) where cross-examination of the prosecution's expert was
effective; and (4) where the expert's testimony would not change the verdict.291
(3) The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. It is
considered ineffective assistance of counsel if defendant's counsel does not hire expert
services when needed. See Jeffrey F. Gheut, Annotation, Construction andApplication
of Provision in Subsection (e) of Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e))
Concerning Right of Indigent Defendant to Aid in Obtaining Services of Investigator
or Expert, 6 A.L.R. FED. 1007 (1971) (citing Proffitt v. United States, 582 F.2d 854
(4th Cir. 1978)).
(4) The Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, including the defendant's
right to obtain witnesses in his favor. See People v. Watson, 221 N.E.2d 645 (I11.
1966).
(5) The Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, including the right to
effectively cross-examine witnesses, which may require the aid of an expert. See
generally John F. Decker, Comment, Expert Services in the Defense of Criminal
Cases: The Constitutional and Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 574
(1982); Note, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigation-
alAssistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 632 (1970).
288. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
289. See, e.g., United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 834 (10th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 929 (10th Cir. 1985); Bamard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d
744 (5th Cir. 1975); Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315, 1319 (10th Cir. 1970).
290. See generally United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1974).
291. See, e.g., United States v. Perrera, 842 F.2d 73 (4th Cir.) (defendant was not
prejudiced by refusal to appoint handwriting expert to assist in responding to
government's expert who merely corroborated other evidence that the defendant had
signed the documents in an insurance fraud scheme), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 837
(1988); United States v. Brewer, 783 F.2d 841 (9th Cir.) (burden of showing actual
prejudice by clear and convincing evidence not met if cross-examination of eyewitness
seemed effective without the assistance of an expert), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 831
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None of these circumstances applies to the admission of DNA profiling
evidence. First, the evidence is almost always pivotal because it usually goes
directly to the issue of guilt or innocence of the defendant. Second, the only
way to show a lack of consensus or a lack of general acceptance in the
scientific community is to have a defense expert testify to this effect. Third,
cross-examination is rarely effective with a complex, technical subject such
as DNA fingerprinting. A defense attorney who did not hire a defense
expert-for advice at the very least-would be ineffective. Finally, where the
defense expert is to testify as to the lack of reliability or the use of improper
techniques, it is apparent that if the DNA evidence is pivotal to the outcome
of the case, the evidence would always have the potential to change the
outcome of the case.
Yet, the right to expert services is meaningless if the defendant's request
is granted by the court but the defense is unable to secure expert services.
Inability to secure expert services may occur for several reasons. First, the
defense attorney may simply neglect the acquisition of expert services;
however, the defendant can attack this on appeal as ineffective assistance of
counsel.292 A second reason is lack of resources for the indigent defendant.
Although the federal government and about half of the states have statutes that
provide funds for defense experts, 293 those funds are prohibitively low,294
(1986); United States v. Sanders, 459 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1972) (trial court did not err
in refusing defense request for expert medical witness because offer of proof showed
that expert's testimony would not have changed the outcome); United States v. Jones,
320 F. Supp. 901 (E.D. Tenn. 1971) (post-conviction defense motion denied where
defendant sought fingerprint expert to examine the evidence of the prosecution's
expert, who was effectively cross-examined); see also, Decker, supra note 287, at 591-
92, 597.
292. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
293. For a list of statutes, see Andre A. Moinssens et al., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
IN CRIMINAL CASES 14 (3d ed. 1986).
294. For example, the Federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(e) (1988), allows indigent defendants a maximum compensation of $1000 for.
expert and investigative services. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(3) (Supp. 1989). Providing
for DNA testing and expert testimony costs much more than that. For instance, the
prosecution in one case spent $9600 for the necessary expert testimony on DNA
testing. Gary Taylor, From One Speck, a Case is Made, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 16, 1989,
at 22, col. 2.
Some courts do not give compensation equal to what the government pays its
witnesses, but rather, what is a fair and reasonable charge in the locality in which the
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and the statutes suffer from the problematic interpretations of what is
considered "necessary" to a defense.295 Economic status is often an effective
bar to an adequate defense.296
There is a final reason, unique to admissibility hearings for novel
scientific evidence, why a defendant in a DNA fingerprinting admissibility
hearing is effectively prevented from fulfilling his right to expert services. In
short, no expert may exist in the field intimately acquainted with the forensic
technique other than the biased proponents of the technique. The defense
attorney is not qualified to initiate the process of scientific inquiry to generate
possible opposition to the technique, and hence is unable to gather a pool of
potential experts.
D. The Right to Retest
The admission of DNA typing evidence also creates an impact on the
right to have an expert retest the prosecution's evidence. Some courts have
found such a right as part of the defendant's right to an adequate defense.
297
services were rendered. See United States v. Pope, 251 F. Supp. 234, 241 (D. Neb.
1966).
295. For instance, courts do not allow expenditure of funds under the Federal
Criminal Justice Act for "mere fishing expeditions," a subjective determination which
could mean the indigent defendant is prevented financially from exploring a full
defense. See United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1978) (trial court's
denial of defendant's request for investigator services to investigate rape victim's
reputation in the community not abuse of discretion because it was a "mere fishing
expedition" and the defense did not show why the two court-appointed lawyers could
not do the investigating), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979). But see United States v.
Schultz, 431 F.2d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 1970) (although an expenditure under the statute
should not be authorized for a "mere fishing expedition," the expenditure should be
provided if further investigation may prove beneficial), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 988
(1974).
296. "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends
on the amount of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (Black,
J.).
297. See Bamard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744,746 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Fundamental
fairness is violated when a criminal defendant ... is denied the opportunity to have
an expert of his choosing, bound by appropriate safeguards imposed by the Court,
examine a piece of critical evidence whose nature is subject to varying expert
opinion."); United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 1970) (if the
government is going to use expensive, time-consuming methods of factfinding, it must
allow time for the defendant to make a similar test and the means for an indigent
defendant to do so), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
In addition to the constitutional right, courts also recognize the right to retest as
part of defense discovery. Most jurisdictions have discovery rules that allow for
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The right to retest is sometimes conditioned on a preliminary showing that the
results will be favorable to the defendant,2 98 or on a showing that the
evidence is critical and "subject to varying expert opinion. 299
Where the right to retest is recognized, the prosecution has an obligation
to give notice of its intention to use the evidence so that the defense has an
adequate opportunity to examine it.3  Furthermore, if the prosecution's
testing consumes the entire sample, as is often the case in DNA profiling, the
prosecution is required in several states to contact the defense attorneys so that
they can have their own expert present during the procedure.0 1 Most courts
have held, however, that it is not a constitutional violation if the prosecution
expert consumes the evidence in a necessary test.302
The right to retest the sample is crucial to the issue of admissibility of
DNA typing evidence and the adequacy of the defense. Even if the defense
finds an expert to testify, that expert will find it difficult if not impossible to
locate errors in the particular test as performed if she is not present when the
testing is performed. For example, if the probes used in the test were
contaminated and created a false positive, the defense expert will only be able
to surmise that this scenario may have happened.
The reliability of a technique means that the test results can be repro-
duced; thus, it is imperative that members of the scientific community retest,
or at least view, the procedure. When a technique is novel, this process must
occur first in the scientific community, and not in the courtroom, to establish
general reliability.
disclosure of the prosecution's scientific reports to the defense, and many provide for
defense inspection of documents and tangible objects, such as bullets, footprint
impressions, articles of clothing, and materials found at the scene. Some interpret and
extend the provision for inspection to include retesting. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16
(broadly defining what can be discovered and inspected).
298. State v. Koennecke, 545 P.2d 127, 133 (Or. 1976).
299. Barnard, 514 F.2d at 746.
300. See United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1969) (results of neutron
activation analysis not admissible because defense was not informed of it until trial,
and therefore had no opportunity to make similar tests and seek its own expert).
301. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-309 (1984) (outlines factors court
should consider when deciding whether to admit the results of a test which consumed
all but an unusable amount of the sample); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51(E)
(Baldwin 1983); State v. Gaddis, 530 S.W.2d 64, 69 (Tenn. 1975); State v. Wright,
557 P.2d 1, 7 (Wash. 1976).
302. See Giannelli & Imwinkelried, supra note 25, at 109 n.98.
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VI. CONCLUSION
DNA fingerprinting is a positive development in identification proce-
dures, providing limitless possibilities for its utilization. Many issues
regarding its admissibility and constitutionality will likely be litigated.
Questions still persist concerning the accuracy of the underlying statistics and
the reliability of experts from the commercial laboratories that perform the
tests. In addition, scientists must firmly establish standards for testing
procedures and laboratory protocol, which are increasingly under attack,
before DNA fingerprints are admissible into evidence. The legislative branch
must consider these concerns and implement legislation to promote uniformity
and fairness.
If these issues are addressed, the advent of DNA fingerprinting is at hand.
With the continued expansion of the test in criminal investigations and the
establishment of DNA fingerprint files, this accurate and reliable identification
tool will greatly aid law enforcement officials. These developments will help
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